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The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Integration in the National Airspace System Project has conducted a series of flight tests 
intended to support the reduction of barriers that prevent unmanned aircraft from flying 
without the required waivers from the Federal Aviation Administration. The 2015 Flight Test 
Series 3, supported two separate test configurations. The first configuration investigated the 
timing of Detect and Avoid alerting thresholds using a radar equipped unmanned vehicle and 
multiple live intruders flown at varying encounter geometries. The second configuration 
included a surrogate unmanned vehicle (flown from a ground control station, with a safety 
pilot on board) flying a mission in a virtual air traffic control airspace sector using research 
pilot displays and Detect and Avoid advisories to maintain separation from live and virtual 
aircraft. The test was conducted over an eight-week span within the R-2508 Special Use 
Airspace. Over 200 encounters were flown for the first configuration, and although the second 
configuration was cancelled after three data collection flights, Flight Test 3 proved to be 
invaluable for the purposes of planning, managing, and execution of this type of integrated 
flight test. 
Nomenclature 
ACAS  = Airborne Collision Avoidance System  
ADS-B      = Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
AFRC  = Armstrong Flight Research Center, Edwards, California 
AFTC  = Air Force Test Center 
AGL  = above ground level 
AIM  = Aeronautical Information Manual 
ARC  = Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California 
ATC  = air traffic control 
AUTO  = automatic 
C2   = command and control 
CA  = collision avoidance 
CAT  = collision avoidance threshold 
CBDR  = constant bearing decreasing range 
CBP  = Customs and Border Protection 
CCB  = Complex Control Board 
CFG  = configuration 
CFR  = Code of Federal Regulations 
CNPC  = control and non-payload communication 
COA  = certificates of authorization 
COMEX = commence exercise 
CPA  = closest point of approach 
CPDS  = Conflict Prediction and Display System 
CRM  = crew resource management 
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CSSA  = Corrective Self-Separation Alert 
CST  = combined systems test  
CTF  = combined test force 
CVSRF  = Crew Vehicle Systems Research Facility  
DAA  = detect and avoid 
DAIDALUS = Detect and AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems 
DATR  = Dryden Aeronautical Test Range 
DD  = decimal degrees 
DEEC  = digital electronic engine control 
DET3  = detachment 3  
DGPS  = differential global positioning system 
DICES  = Digital Integrated Communications Electronic System 
DME  = distance measuring equipment 
DMOD  = distance modification 
DRR  = due regard radar 
DSRL  = Distributed Simulation Research Laboratory 
EAFB  = Edwards Air Force Base 
EDM  = engineering development model 
ENC  = encounter 
FAA  = Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR  = Federal Aviation Regulation  
FDDRL  = Flight Deck Display Research Laboratory 
FINEX  = finish exercise 
FL   = flight level 
FM  = Full Mission 
FSE  = flight systems engineer 
FT3  = Flight Test 3 
FT4  = Flight Test 4 
FTE  = flight-test engineer 
FTP  = flight-test plan 
FV   = FalconView 
GA-ASI  = General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. 
GCS  = ground control station 
GPS  = global positioning system 
GRC  = Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio 
GS   = groundspeed 
H/S  = high speed 
HSI  = Human Systems Integration  
HUD  = head-up display 
IASP  = Integrated Aviation Systems Program 
ID   = identification 
IFR  = instrument flight rules 
IHITL  = integrated human-in-the-loop 
ILLA  = Ikhana lost-link altitude  
ILLH  = Ikhana lost-link heading  
IMU  = inertial measurement unit 
INS  = Inertial Navigation System 
INT  = intruder 
IP   = initial point 
IT&E  = Integrated Test and Evaluation 
ITAR  = International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
JADEM  = Java Architecture for DAA Extensibility and Modeling 
KBFI  = ICAO airfield code for King Field in Seattle, Washington 
KBFL  = ICAO airfield code for Meadows Field in Bakersfield, California 
KEDW  = ICAO airfield code for Edwards Air Force Base, California 
KGS  = knots groundspeed 
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KIAS  = knots indicated airspeed 
KPMD  = ICAO airfield code for Palmdale airfield in Palmdale, California 
KTAS  = knots true airspeed 
KVCV  = ICAO airfield code for Victorville, California 
KVNY  = ICAO airfield code for Van Nuys, California 
LaRC  = Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 
LOS  = line of sight 
LRO  = long range optics 
LSP  = launch sequence plan 
LVC  = Live Virtual Constructive 
MACS  = Multi Aircraft Control System 
MC  = magnetic course 
MIT  = Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lexington, Massachusetts 
MOA  = military operating area 
MOPS  = Minimum Operational Performance Standards 
MP  = maneuver point 
MR  = Mission Rule  
MSL  = mean sea level  
NAS  = National Airspace System 
NASA  = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NMAC  = near mid-air collision 
NOTAM = notice to airmen 
O/S            =  ownship 
OWG  = Operations Working Group 
OWN  = ownship  
PIRA  = Precision Impact Range Area 
PSSA  = Preventive Self-Separation Alert 
PT6  = Part Task 6 
RA  = resolution advisory 
RAIF  = Research Aircraft Integration Facility 
RDR  = radar 
REH  = rehearsal 
RF   = radio frequency 
RGCS  = research ground control station 
RSO  = range safety officer 
RTB  = return to base 
RTCA  = Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
S/N  = scenario number 
SA   = situational awareness 
SAA  = sense and avoid 
SAAP  = sense and avoid processor 
SAF  = Stand-Alone Facility 
SC-228 ToR = Special Committee-228 Terms of Reference  
SGT  = Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies 
SME  = subject matter expert 
SOP  = standard operating procedures  
SOR  = senior operations representative 
SPORT  = Space Positioning Optical Radar Tracking 
SS   = self-separation 
SSCA  = Self-Separation Corrective Alert 
SSI  = separation assurance/sense and avoid interoperability 
SSPT  = Self-Separation Proximate Traffic 
SSWA  = Self-Separation Warning Alert 
SSWG  = System Safety Working Group 
STM  = surveillance tracking module 
SUT  = system under test 
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TA   = traffic advisory 
TBD  = to be determined 
TC   = test conductor 
TCAS  = Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
TCOR  = test coordinator 
TD   = test director 
TECCS  = Test and Evaluation Command and Control System 
TFR  = temporary flight restriction 
TRACON = Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility 
TRC  = tracker 
TSPI  = time, space, position information 
UAS  = Unmanned Aircraft System 
UAS-NAS = UAS Integration in the NAS project 
USAF  = United States Air Force 
UTC  = coordinated universal time 
V&V  = verification and validation 
VBA  = Visual Basic for Applications 
VID  = visual identification 
VMC  = visual meteorological conditions 
VSCS  = Vigilant Spirit Control Station 
VSI  = vertical speed indicator 
VSM  = vehicle specific module 
WCV  = well-clear violation 
WP  = waypoint  
ZOA  = Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center 
 
I. Introduction 
HE desire and ability to fly Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) is of 
increasing urgency.1 The application of unmanned aircraft to perform national security, defense, scientific, and 
emergency management are driving the critical need for less restrictive access by UAS to the NAS. UAS represent a 
new capability that will provide a variety of services in the government (public) and commercial (civil) aviation 
sectors. The growth of this potential industry has not yet been realized due to the lack of a common understanding of 
what is required to safely operate UAS in the NAS.2  
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) UAS Integration in the NAS Project (UAS-NAS) is 
conducting research in the areas of Separation Assurance/Sense and Avoid Interoperability, Human Systems 
Integration (HSI), and Communication to support reducing the barriers to routine UAS access to the NAS. This 
research is broken into two research themes, namely, UAS Integration and Test Infrastructure. UAS Integration 
focuses on airspace integration procedures and performance standards to enable UAS integration in the air 
transportation system, covering Sense and Avoid (SAA) performance standards, command and control performance 
standards, and human systems integration. The focus of Test Infrastructure is to enable development and validation of 
airspace integration procedures and performance standards, including integrated test and evaluation. In support of the 
integrated test and evaluation efforts, the project will develop an adaptable and scalable relevant test environment 
capable of evaluating concepts and technologies for UAS to safely operate in the NAS. 
 To accomplish this task, the project will conduct a series of human-in-the-loop and flight-test activities that 
integrate key concepts, technologies, and/or procedures in a relevant air traffic environment. Each of the integrated 
events will build on the technical achievements, fidelity, and complexity of the previous tests and technical 
simulations, resulting in research findings that support the development of regulations governing the access of UAS 
into the NAS.  
A. Purpose and Scope 
The integrated Flight Test 3 (FT3) gathered data for UAS researchers for their development and evaluation of a 
communication system, Sense and Avoid (referred to as Detect and Avoid (DAA) in the Radio Technical Commission 
for Aeronautics (RTCA) SC 228 ToR) algorithms, and pilot displays for candidate UAS systems in a relevant 
environment.3 The technical goals of FT3 were to:  
T 
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1) Perform an end to end traffic encounter test of pilot guidance generated by self-separation (SS) algorithms 
(aircraft sensor to wind, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II, and latency uncertainties to the 
ground control station (GCS) display);  
2) Conduct a flight test of the prototype communication system as part of an integrated DAA system;  
3) Collect data to inform the preliminary draft of the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for 
DAA and command and control (C2), to include display and human performance standards in both MOPS. 
Furthermore, FT3 increased the team’s capabilities and reduced the risks associated with building a pertinent flight-
test environment moving towards the final flight tests, Flight Test 4 (FT4) and Capstone. 
The UAS-NAS project support and participation in the 2014 flight test of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System 
(ACAS) Xu and SS initial flight test significantly contributed to building up infrastructure, developing procedures, 
and reducing risk for FT3. The FT3 experiment was divided into two distinct test configurations, each focusing on 
different aspects of the primary technical goals. The first (described as Pairwise Encounters and Configuration 1) 
looked at the SS and collision avoidance (CA) algorithms to support the definition of well clear and TCAS integration 
onto the “ownship” aircraft platform. The second (described as Full Mission (FM), Configuration 2 flights) focused 
on UAS pilot response times to, and acceptability of, the same SAA alerts, resolutions, and GCS displays under real 
world uncertainties.  
Configuration 1 test execution began on June 15, 2015, was completed on July 27, 2015, and comprised 12 flights 
and more than 200 test points. NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC) (Edwards, California) provided the 
primary ownship test aircraft for this configuration. Full Mission flights Configuration 2 began concurrently on July 
16, 2015, and was concluded early on August 12, 2015. NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) (Cleveland, Ohio) 
provided the primary ownship test aircraft for this configuration as well as the Communication system under test 
(SUT). The Configuration 2 phase conducted three test sorties and nine systems integration sorties, but was unable to 
achieve the desired performance needed by the primary research stakeholder. Therefore, it was concluded early with 
plans to further develop the system and proceeded with alternative modeling and simulation data throughout the 
remainder of 2015 and the beginning of 2016. The test period did not exceed original planned schedule estimates, 
even though Configuration 1 took longer than expected, and Configuration 2 was concluded early. 
Testing facilities are Government owned, managed, leased, or under agreement and fall into two categories:  
1. Development Facilities 
 Distributed Simulation Research Laboratory (DSRL) at NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) (Moffett Field, 
California) 
 Flight Deck Display Research Laboratory (FDDRL) at NASA ARC 
 Research Aircraft Integration Facility (RAIF) at NASA AFRC 
 UAS Sense and Avoid Research Lab at Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies (SGT), outside of NASA Langley 
Research Center (LaRC) (Hampton, Virginia) 
 Aircraft Operations Research Hangar at NASA GRC 
 Communication Laboratory at NASA GRC 
 General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated (GA-ASI) Gray Butte Flight Operations Facility 
(Palmdale, California) 
 GA-ASI Poway System Integration Lab (Poway, California) 
2. Test Facilities 
 Crew Vehicle Systems Research Facility (CVSRF) at NASA ARC 
 DSRL at NASA ARC 
 RAIF at NASA AFRC 
 Dryden Aeronautical Test Range (DATR) at NASA AFRC 
 Stand Alone Facility (SAF) Mission Control Room at NASA AFRC 
 The Radio Frequency (RF) Communications facility at NASA AFRC 
 Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB) R-2508 Complex (Edwards, California) 
B. Stakeholders 
The NASA Integrated Aviation Systems Program (IASP) provides direction for the UAS-NAS project. The project 
office had the overall responsibility for the FT3 flight test. NASA ARC, NASA AFRC, NASA GRC, NASA LaRC, 
GA-ASI, and Honeywell International, Inc. (Morris Plains, New Jersey), supported the project and were participants 
in the FT3 activity. The following is a brief description of responsibilities: 
6 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 NASA ARC: NASA ARC provided the HSI research requirements for subject pilot evaluation based on 
performance during scenario events. Subject pilots performed scenario tests from the Research Ground 
Control Station (RGCS) located at NASA AFRC. Further, the AFRC Integrated Test and Evaluation (IT&E) 
team supported the AFRC Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) and provided the virtual air traffic control (ATC) 
component, which included a “ghost” controller, pseudo pilots, and Oakland air traffic controllers for virtual 
ATC. ARC also provided AutoResolver/Java Architecture for DAA Extensibility and Modeling (JADEM), 
one of the SS algorithms used during Configuration 1.  
 NASA AFRC: NASA AFRC IT&E was the responsible test organization for all test missions flown from 
AFRC. AFRC provided the RGCS for subject pilot evaluation. Further, AFRC hosted the LVC infrastructure 
for data distribution between NASA ARC, GRC, and LaRC. AFRC also provided some live manned aircraft 
used as intruders for both configurations. Additionally, AFRC provided NASA 870, “Ikhana” Predator B 
(General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Incorporated, Poway, California) as the unmanned aircraft ownship 
platform for Configuration 1 encounters within the R-2515 airspace.  
 NASA GRC: NASA GRC was the participating test organization for all test missions flown with the NASA 
608 T-34C (Beechcraft Corporation, Wichita, Kansas) aircraft. GRC provided the communication and 
control system interface and the UAS surrogate ownship aircraft for use during FM flights. Although initially 
planned, the NASA GRC S-3B Viking aircraft (Lockheed Corporation, now Lockheed Martin, Bethesda, 
Maryland) was not available for use as a high-speed ownship/intruder during Configuration 1 testing.  
 NASA LaRC: NASA LaRC provided a SS algorithm (Stratway+) that was displayed and evaluated by subject 
pilots during flight encounters. 
 GA-ASI: GA-ASI provided hardware, software, and integration support on the Ikhana UAS and specifically 
the Due Regard Radar (DRR). GA-ASI also provided pairwise encounter requirements for autonomous 
aircraft response maneuvers to TCAS alerting, as well as a SS algorithm, the Conflict Prediction and Display 
System (CPDS), for evaluation. 
 Honeywell International, Inc.: Honeywell provided the software for the Surveillance Tracking Module 
(STM) prototype that contained the Honeywell Fusion Tracker. Honeywell also provided a TCAS II equipped 
intruder aircraft (N3GC) in support of both configurations. The N3GC aircraft had onboard TCAS recording 
capability, and that recorded data were made available to the rest of the FT3 test team to support data analysis. 
In order to coordinate among these multiple and cross-center stakeholders, an Operations Working Group (OWG) 
was created for FT3. The OWG, which met weekly on Tuesdays and fortnightly on Fridays prior to testing, discussed 
all FT3 ground and flight operations topics. The working group was responsible for flight planning and coordination, 
assigning actions items, safety concerns which would feed into the System Safety Working Group (SSWG), hardware 
integration and testing discussion, training, and readiness. The OWG was responsible for a large part of the successes 
in FT3. 
II. Flight-Test Period, Configuration, and Equipage 
NASA 870, known as Ikhana, served as the ownship for the Configuration 1 flight-test series. NASA 608, the 
GRC T-34C aircraft, served as the ownship for the Configuration 2 flight-test series. Flight-test encounter setups 
included a single ownship versus a single intruder or a single ownship versus multiple intruders (two maximum). The 
intruder role was supported by multiple aircraft due to availability and crew rest considerations. All aircraft that 
participated in this flight test were equipped with navigation systems that use a global positioning system (GPS). All 
manned intruder aircraft were equipped with TCAS, and the Honeywell C90 King Air was equipped with TCAS II 
version 7.1. The aircraft required to complete the test series are identified in Table 1. Flight crew are identified in 
Table 2. 
The flight-test period spanned from June 15, 2015 to August 12, 2015. The flight days are detailed in Table 3. 
Configuration 1 had one check out flight and 11 data collection flights, while Configuration 2 had 12 check out type 
flights and 3 data collection flights. Along with the aircraft and flight crew assets, an operations mission control team 
was utilized to manage the overall test effort. The test conductor (TC) was responsible for overall mission success and 
the coordination of all test assets. The test director (TD) provided flight safety oversight and supported the test 
conductor by performing all back channel and engineering channel coordination. The Test coordinator (TCOR) acted 
as the scribe and performed control room supporting tasks. The mission control team was located in the NASA AFRC 
SAF mission control room for all test missions performed during FT3. Furthermore, engineering coordinators in the 
LVC, Ikhana GCS, and ARC virtual ATC/pilot coordination facility supported the operation. Table 4 breaks out these 
teams based on configuration. 
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Table 1. Aircraft equipage including sensors, configuration, and additional information. Ownships are 
highlighted in green, while intruders are in red. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Flight Test Series 3 aircraft and flight crew. 
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Table 3. Summary of flights from Flight Test Series 3 for UAS-NAS, with data collection flights highlighted in 
green. 
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Table 4. Mission team. 
 
 
III. Flight-Test Information 
Flight Test Series 3 was an intricate operation that included multiple stakeholders, staging locations, and precise 
coordination. This section outlines the planning that was involved to perform Configurations 1 and 2, which both 
occurred within the R-2508 Complex. 
A. Operating Area 
The operating area for the Configuration 1 flight test occurred in the Restricted Airspace, R-2515, located at EAFB, 
along with the Buckhorn military operating area (MOA), with operations scheduled and coordinated through the Air 
Force Test Center (AFTC). Specific airspace scheduled each day during these flight tests included the Four Corners 
Area, Mercury Spin Area, overflight of the Precision Impact Range Area (PIRA) East/West, and the Buckhorn MOA. 
These areas within R-2515 are depicted within the yellow shaded area shown in Fig. 1.  
This operating area was adequate for the majority of the Configuration 1 encounters. However, there were some 
encounters that required either or both the intruder and ownship to extend geographically north or west, remaining 
within R-2515, of the airspace. The extensions were required to either start or complete these encounters. For those 
encounters where an extension was required to accomplish the test encounter, approval from the controlling agency, 
Space Positioning Optical Radar Tracking (SPORT), was required. In some cases the extension was not permitted and 
the encounter was either terminated early or skipped. The Buckhorn MOA was used by the manned intruder aircraft 
(only) for many of the test encounters. 
The operating area for the Configuration 2 flight test required both an R-2508 as well as an R-2515 clearance due 
to the length of the mission plan, and therefore, included additional organizational cross talk between High Desert 
Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility (TRACON) and SPORT controlling agencies. The Isabella MOA block 
10,000 ft to 16,000 ft MSL and the western portion of R-2515 were used for this configuration. The primary working 
area for this configuration is shown in Fig. 2.  
The fire mission route (depicted in green on Fig. 2) was the ownship route of flight. Given that ownship transited 
between the Isabella MOA and R-2515, prior coordination with Joshua and SPORT controllers was required to ensure 
a seamless communication flow from one agency to the next. Although on some of the sorties extra coordination was 
required, for the majority of these flights, no significant problems were noted. 
It is important to note that NASA operations within R-2515 are subject to the priority of United States Air Force 
(USAF) programs under the AFTC. Generally speaking, NASA is given a general priority that is superseded by most 
other AFTC operations. Configuration 2 flights were impacted by this low prioritization and required several 
mitigations that were in one case acceptable, and in two other cases, were inadequate. On one occasion the sortie start 
time was changed to avoid an airspace conflict, which was acceptable to the test team. On two other occasions the 
ownship route of flight and the Intruder route needed modification to avoid R-2515 altogether. These modifications, 
however, were not adequate for the test team. 
B. Aircraft Staging and Locations 
During FT3 both intruders and ownship aircraft operated from three different locations. The Honeywell N3GC 
aircraft operated from Van Nuys, KVNY, for both configurations, and the NASA 608 aircraft operated from both 
Palmdale, KPMD (during systems check flights) and Bakersfield, KBFL, for the three Configuration 2 mission flights. 
All other aircraft, Ikhana and intruders, operated from AFRC, KEDW. The geographical separation resulted in some 
operational challenges that were overcome with mission planning. Figure 3 depicts the staging locations for each 
aircraft. 
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C. Weather 
FT3 mission rules and an Ikhana standard mission rule required all tests to be conducted in Visual Meteorological 
Conditions (VMC) and 3 statute miles of visibility with at least 1,000 ft of cloud clearance above and below planned 
block altitude. Additionally, other Ikhana standard mission rules prohibited flight into known icing conditions as well 
as transit through visible moisture for repositioning operations. All other participating aircraft complied with their 
operating limitations as defined by their respective flight manuals for repositioning operations.  
No Configuration 1 flights were cancelled due to weather, and all flights were completed as originally scheduled. 
On Flight 5 the visibility was reduced (due to smoke/haze generated by the Lake fire), although still likely greater 
than 3 miles; this condition was considered a contributing factor for a mission rule violation when an encounter 
occurred without the intruder having a visual on Ikhana.  
Configuration 2 was impacted by weather with one cancellation on August 6, 2015 when broken cloud layers 
impacted the northern half of the desired operating airspace. All other Configuration 2 flights were completed as 
scheduled; however, high winds aloft, greater than 30 kn, were noted on several occasions and needed to be accounted 
for when controlling each individual intercept. High winds aloft resulting in incorrect compensations were a 
contributing factor to two or possibly more individual encounters not achieving desired alerting results. 
D. Stand Alone Facility Mission Control Room 
The SAF, located at the NASA AFRC main building, was used by the operations team to coordinate, manage, and 
execute the flight test. The room was configured with three workstations and multiple support stations; one of the 
three workstations was dedicated to UAS-NAS operations while the other two were used to support other programs 
(though not concurrently). Each workstation was configured with a Digital Integrated Communications Electronic 
System (DICES) III voice communication system and several display monitors, shown in Fig. 4. Zeus, Test and 
Evaluation Command and Control System (TECCS), Ikhana video camera, and Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS) 
traffic displays provided situational awareness (SA) and two way voice capability to the control room team for test 
execution. 
1. Control Displays 
The Raytheon (Waltham, Massachusetts) Solipsys Zeus system acted as the primary control display for both TC 
and TD positions. The Zeus system used surveillance radar information to provide time space position information 
(TSPI) to the test team. The imbedded range and bearing tool were used to maintain range SA in order to ensure 
mission rule visual required compliance when applicable. The use of Zeus as the SA and mission control tool for FT3 
was required for mission success, and the test was completed with no safety incidents and one mission rule violation. 
The upper right two displays (Fig. 4) were repeaters of the SUT data sourced from the LVC. Using these displays 
the LVC would pipe JADEM, Stratway+, CPDS, and radar information to the SAF. The upper left two displays were 
used as test support displays and included a repeater of the Ikhana head-up display (HUD) video, which provided 
TCAS advisory information as well as state information for Ikhana such as altitude, heading, and airspeed. Additional 
information was available on the upper left displays and included long range optics (LRO) (if active) and access to 
commercial weather sources. 
2. Test Coordinator Position 
Throughout the FT3 event an additional position was matured to support data collection. The test coordinator 
position (located to the right of the image in Fig. 4) was a simple workstation that included a desk, large monitor, and 
computer docking station. The workstation was not restricted to the secure intranet that the TC and TD position 
required and enabled access to the external network. The team was able to use public access tools such as online 
aircraft tracking tools, aviation maps, route plotting software, and word processing software products not available on 
the TC/TD computers.  
The primary role for TCOR was to collect test data for use during debriefs as well as this paper. However, being 
able to access the online tools and additional software proved to be invaluable as it provided information Zeus could 
not, such as: takeoff and landing TSPI for KVNY, King Field, Seattle, Washington (KBFI), and KPMD; screen 
captures; simple encounter replay; weather information; access to all planning material; and other administrative data. 
The operations team found this workstation, mission control room position, and external tools as instrumental to 
supporting the overall flight-test execution. 
E. Mission Information 
Executing FT3 flights required significant coordination. Configuration 1 flights were planned at a rate of three 
flights per week due to the duration of each sortie and the amount of test cards executed per sortie. Furthermore, flying 
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the encounters was user work load intensive with 10 minutes allocated to each encounter and setup required in between 
runs. Configuration 2 work load was considerably less intensive for the airborne participants as the subject pilot under 
test was now located in the RGCS, and the overall design of the Full Mission test provided a more controlled 
environment than is available to a pilot under test operating from an airborne aircraft. 
As a pre-requisite to executing Configuration 1 flight tests, a T-1 crew briefing was accomplished the day prior to 
the event. The T-1 briefing covered, in detail, the following aspects related to the upcoming flight: 
 Roll call 
 Mission summary 
 Mission timeline 
 Weather/notice to airmen (NOTAM)s  
 UAS status 
 Mission information  
 GCS status 
 Airspace/airfield  
 Support assets 
 Contingencies 
 Miscellaneous 
 Flight card review 
A flight could be delayed or postponed based on information discussed during the T-1 briefing. All team members 
were required to participate in the briefing either in person or remotely.  
Configuration 2 flights did not require a T-1 briefing for each event. Given the static nature of the fireline route 
and intruder routes, a T-1 briefing for each flight was considered excessive and any changes were briefed at the 
preflight briefing conducted 2.5 hours prior to takeoff. Changes were minimal and largely constituted discussion of 
contingency plans for loss of airspace or weather effects.  
All FT3 Configuration 1 flight briefings began at 0415 local time in order to make a 0600 local take off time. The 
morning briefings covered at a higher level the same information with emphasis on any changes from the previous 
T-1 briefing. The intent was for this briefing to be about 15 minutes in length. A final go/no-go decision was made at 
this briefing. After the brief, the team was dismissed to prepare for the flight, and in some cases, additional crew 
familiarity training was conducted for each display SUT. The SAF was manned at approximately 0545 local time to 
support any systems troubleshooting or coordination efforts required by the supporting aircraft teams.  
In general, flights were planned for approximately 5 hours. One hour of that total flight time was allocated to 
transit, altimeter calibration, and DAA system startup procedures. The limiting factor for the Ikhana was frequency 
coordination and typically required an OFF time of 1100 local time for both Satcom and line of sight (LOS) 
frequencies. For the intruders, fuel available was the limiting factor. The T-34C aircraft could only support up to 
3.5 hours of flight. The King Air aircraft could support 4.0 hours, although on a few occasions the N3GC aircraft 
landed in Victorville, California (KVCV) for fuel and then returned to the test site, which provided the test team an 
additional 20 minutes of time aloft. Moreover, the longer transit times required by the N3GC aircraft due to operating 
out of KVNY had to be considered for fuel planning. 
A flight debrief was mandatory in order to discuss the flight events of the day, identify any aircraft discrepancies, 
and discuss test inefficiencies that may have decreased the number of encounters and test objectives achieved. Action 
items were assigned for issues and lessons learned that needed to be closed out prior to the next flight. A post-flight-
test-card review and high level data analysis was conducted as well. If the next flight occurred on the following day, 
a T-1 briefing was then conducted to review test objectives for that next flight; otherwise the T-1 briefing, as 
appropriate, was conducted prior to the next test opportunity. 
Figures 5 and 6 show the Configuration 1 and 2 timelines, respectively. Start of test day for Configuration 1 flights 
was typically 0415 local time and completed around 1415 local time, while the Configuration 2 flights started at 1200 
local time and the end of test day was approximately 1945 local time. 
F. Training and Qualifications 
All visiting flight crew team members were required to participate in a local area familiarization briefing and 
conduct a local area familiarization flight. In addition, all flight crew and mission team members were required to 
have obtained current crew resource management (CRM) training. The TC and TD were required to obtain a formal 
approval from the NASA AFRC Director of Flight Operations in order to serve in that capacity. The requirements for 
the FT3 test conductor were derived from NASA AFRC Mission Control Procedure. The requirements were tailored 
from the mission controller section. 
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1. Pre-Test Coordination and Training 
A training event was conducted approximately one month prior to the start of the test. Representatives from all 
aircraft participants, SUT stakeholders, and IT&E operations were present. The following is a list of training and 
coordination conducted.  
Administration/Motherhood:  
 R-2508 annual refresher training–conducted by R-2508 representatives 
 R-2515 detailed training–conducted by R-2515 SPORT representatives  
 International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) constraints  
 Basic flight administration expectations  
Test Administration:  
 Mission rules and Go/No-Go criteria  
 Roles and responsibilities  
 Terminology  
 General flight day timeline  
 Communication plan  
 Altimeter check 
 Success criteria  
 Contingencies, aborts, and lost links  
Test Execution:  
 Specific encounters and test card overview  
At the completion of this training event, all stakeholders and aircrew were considered prepared and ready to 
support the FT3 events in the planned airspace, by all oversight organizations. 
2. System Under Test Training 
SUT training was conducted closer to the actual flight date. Aircrew availability and subject matter expert (SME) 
availability were the two primary reasons that the training was conducted either as part of the T-1 briefing or following 
the flight briefing at 0415L. This training was used to inform the aircrew who would be executing the flight, and what 
each SME was expecting from them. The following questions were addressed during these exchanges.  
 Test configuration: What does the SME/researcher want; on, off, or de-energized? 
 Maneuver type: Maneuvering (mitigated) or non-maneuvering (unmitigated)? 
 Guidance type: Will the SUT provide directive or descriptive guidance?  
 Display under test familiarity: What display will the aircrew be using to gain SA and make a maneuver 
decision?   
 Miscellaneous expectations: Is there anything specific to a particular SUT that the aircrew need to know?  
Given that there were multiple SUT being evaluated during FT3, variations were observed in the quantity and 
quality of training that the aircrew received. Training conducted by the SME on the CPDS system was considered the 
most thorough, timely, and informative. The CPDS training was conducted the day prior to the flight in a separate 
presentation with just the operations team present. Representations of CPDS in both picture format as well as a replay 
of previous simulated events were presented to the crew. In some cases, training and explanation of the SUT were 
required during the conduct of the flight. Had the training sessions been more thorough, using the CPDS training as 
an example, more efficiencies would have been gained by the test team and potentially better data collected.  
G. Altimeter Calibration 
An altimeter calibration was required for all encounters where the vertical separation between intruders and 
ownship was less than 500 ft. The mission rule was enforced for Configuration 1 flights; however, during 
Configuration 2, it was waived and not required due to all aircraft having a pilot on board and practicing see and avoid. 
1. Configuration 1 
The altimeter calibration was designed to take out the standard errors found within the pitot-static systems in order 
to ensure the planned vertical separation was as close to planned as possible. According to Federal Aviation 
Requirement (FAR) 91.411 and 14 CFR Part 43, Appendix E, aircraft pitot-static systems must be within 75 ft of field 
elevation when dialed into the local altimeter setting. Additional errors come with changes in altitude and airspeed. 
Since some of the planned encounters were with a 200-ft vertical separation, it was possible to be much closer with 
the errors identified above if they were not mitigated with the calibration.  
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The calibration was conducted at a flight condition that closely approximated all the planned encounters; 140 KIAS 
and 13,000 ft MSL. In order to accomplish calibration, Ikhana acted as the lead aircraft with intruder aircraft joining 
on the Ikhana wing in close formation (one aircraft at a time for multiship missions). The Ikhana platform set standard 
29.92 inHg, and the other aircraft adjusted their altimeter settings to indicate the same altitude readout. At those 
conditions each participating aircraft observed the difference from Ikhana. The N3GC aircraft consistently showed 
60 ft-high and the NASA 865 aircraft 100-ft high. The altimeter calibration was performed using the flight card shown 
in Fig. 7. 
2. Configuration 2 
Although the Configuration 2 encounters were planned at 400-ft altitude separation, the test team received approval 
to waive the altimeter calibration as the conduct of such would require approximately 30 minutes to complete, with 
limited technical and no safety value. For the following reasons the team elected to exclude the altimeter calibration:  
 All aircraft set local altimeter settings.  
 All participating aircraft are both properly maintained (24-month certification) and perform a ground 
altimeter check daily based off of known field elevation with local altimeter set (±75 ft) prior to takeoff 
according to the Federal Aviation Administration Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) 7-2-3, and 
14 CFR Part 43, Appendix E. 
 All aircraft are TCAS equipped.  
 Ownship will be maneuvering (lateral or vertical) away from conflict.  
 Configuration 2 encounters are SS alerting encounters where the alerting threshold is 120 seconds prior to 
the closest point of approach (CPA). 
 All participating aircraft are manned and all encounters require visual identification (VID) by 1 nmi between 
aircraft based off of the TCAS Mission Rule (MR) FT3-9. 
 Altimeter calibration data were not required for user interface SUT. 
All Configuration 2 encounters were less than 400-ft altitude separation. The team elected to not conduct an 
altimeter calibration during these flights which impacted operations in the following ways. Positively, the team was 
able to conduct two fireline route data collection runs per test day. Had an altimeter calibration been conducted, the 
ability to conduct two runs may have been limited or not possible. However, in some cases, the 400-ft separation was 
too great and failed to trigger the appropriate SUT alerting. Had the runs been conducted at 300 or 200 ft of separation, 
more encounters would have successfully triggered the desired alerting.  
H. Safety and Mission Rules 
All operations were conducted in accordance with NASA AFRC safety policies. A safety representative was 
present for all operations planning and was responsible for chairing the SSWG. All encounters and configurations 
were concurred with by the safety representative. The following mission rules were developed in a coordinated effort 
with the need to maintain approved levels of safety paramount.  
Table 5 mission rules were used during Configuration 1 flights. They comprised two sections: the first section is 
the standard to Ikhana project rules and independent of the supported project; the second being specific to FT3. 
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Table 5. Configuration 1 mission rules. 
 
Rule 
# 
Rule description – flight Rationale/hazard report Notes 
Ikhana standard 
1 
Any team member may call an abort for pilots to 
abort the flight at any time for safety reasons. 
SOP, FT3-01, FT3-02, FT3-07  
2 
Only authorized AFRC employees and AFRC 
approved pilots are permitted to operate the aircraft. 
Restrict pilots/operators to the 
authorized group 
 
3a 
Only authorized AFRC employees and AFRC 
approved system monitors are permitted to operate 
the GCS. 
Restrict system monitors to the 
authorized group  
 
3b 
Only authorized AFRC employee and AFRC 
approved Flight Systems Engineers (FSEs) are 
permitted to assist the PIC and operate Payloads 
from PSO2. 
Restrict FSEs to the authorized 
group  
 
4 
Ikhana will be operated according to FAA, AFRC, 
USAF, CBP, and General Atomics standard and 
emergency procedures. 
SOP, AFRC aircraft checklist 
for hosting; Space Act 
Agreement, FT3-01, FT3-03 
 
5 
Flight will remain within R-2515 and in accordance 
with any applicable COA restrictions for Predator 
B. 
SOP  
6 No envelope expansion tests will be performed. FT3-05, FT3-06, FT3-13  
8 
Flights will be conducted in VMC conditions of no 
more than moderate turbulence.   
SOP 
COA requirement - VMC 
 
9 No flight in known icing conditions. 
Standard Hazard Mitigation 
No de-icing capability 
 
10 
No flight through opaque clouds, nor sustained 
flight through translucent clouds. 
Standard Hazard Mitigation 
No de-icing capability 
Laminar flow wing 
 
11 Monitor weather forecasts for icing conditions. 
Standard Hazard Mitigation  
No de-icing capability 
 
12 No flight over densely populated areas.   
Standard Hazard Mitigation, 
Dryden Range Mission Rule 
 
13 No flights above 45,000 ft. 
DEEC envelope clearance has 
only been conducted to 45,000 ft 
 
14 
Inside R-2515, the AFRC/EAFB RSO has real-time 
directive authority, including vehicle destruction, to 
the Ikhana pilot. Note: RSO responsibility and 
authority may be delegated to the Ikhana PIC as a 
result of RSO recommendation and Tech Brief 
Committee concurrence. 
Range Safety Plan  
15 
If returning with a controllable, but compromised 
aircraft, to the best degree possible, the flight path 
will avoid over flight of populated areas and major 
roads to the maximum extent possible. 
AFRC process for Range Safety 
Requirement to avoid 
population areas, FT3-14 
 
16 
If generator out, land at EDW 22/04 with battery 
bus voltage at least 23.6 V, otherwise, make a 
lakebed landing. 
Provides at least >/=20 minutes 
of battery power to land, taxi, 
and shutdown aircraft 
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Table 5. Continued. 
Rule 
# 
Rule description – flight Rationale/hazard report Notes 
FT3 specific 
FT3-1 
Test runs will be conducted in VMC with inflight 
visibility at least 3 statute miles. 
Standard Hazard Mitigation  
FT3-2 
Test runs will be conducted clear of clouds and with 
at least 1000-ft cloud clearance above and below 
the planned test block, including abort maneuvers. 
FTP, Standard Hazard 
Mitigation 
  
FT3-4 
At the beginning of each test run, pilots will check 
their navigational system accuracy; runs with less 
than 500-ft vertical separation will be aborted if the 
predicted error exceeds 0.1 nmi. 
FTP, Mission Rule, FT3-01, 
FT3-02 
Acceptable 
error is 
0.1 nmi 
FT3-5 
All participating aircraft will maintain at least 
1000-ft vertical separation from other participating 
aircraft between test runs unless visual. Maintain 
deconfliction altitude noted on each test card or as 
instructed.   
FTP, Standard Hazard 
Mitigation,  FT3-03 
 
FT3-6 
Intruder aircraft will not climb/descend to scenario 
altitude until Ikhana has reestablished its 
deconfliction altitude.  
FTP, Mission Rule, FT3-03   
FT3-7 
The test run will be aborted if a UAS loses LOS 
link. 
Hazard Mitigation FT3-03 
This MR is 
not applicable 
during low 
altitude test 
runs.  
FT3-8 
The test run will be reset if timing constraints of ±5 
to ±10 seconds (as defined for each test encounter) 
cannot be met by a minimum of 120 seconds prior 
to CPA. 
FTP, Hazard Mitigation 
Number of 
seconds is 
test run/point 
specific 
Some test 
runs/points 
will be 
greater than 
120 seconds 
of steady 
state 
variables.   
FT3-9 
For all test encounters where vertical separation is 
less than 500 ft, the test run will be aborted if all 
manned aircraft do not have visual on all 
participating aircraft at any point inside 1 nmi 
separation. 
FTP, Hazard Mitigation  
FT3-
10 
During auto TCAS runs, the test run will be aborted 
if Ikhana begins an automatic maneuver in the 
opposite direction than expected for that test 
encounter. 
Hazard Mitigation, FT3-01  
FT3-
11 
The test run will be aborted if any aircraft is off-
track by more than 0.1 nmi inside 1 minute to CPA. 
FTP, Mission Rule, FT3-01  
FT3-
12 
The manned intruder pilot will not follow a TCAS 
contrary to the pre-briefed abort procedures unless 
they have reason to believe the RA is generated by 
non-participating traffic and they have SA on 
ownship position. 
FTP, Hazard Mitigation  
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Table 5. Concluded. 
Rule 
# 
Rule description – flight Rationale/hazard report Notes 
FT3-
13 
Update of the appropriate Ikhana Lost Link Mission 
variables (Entry Waypoint, ILLH, ILLA) will be 
verified, by both aircrew and the Mission Director, 
prior to commencing each test run.   
FTP, Hazard Mitigation, FT3-
01, FT3-03 
Lost link 
mission 
identified on 
each test card.  
FT3-
14 
When not on a test run, Ikhana crew will ensure 
SAAP Maneuver Mode is set to ADVISORY or 
OFF. 
Mission Rule, FT3-02   
FT3-
15 
Anytime below 5000-ft AGL, SAAP auto 
maneuvering modes will be ADVISORY or OFF. 
Mission Rule, FT3-02, FT3-19  
FT3-
16 
Confirm each aircraft’s nav system time matches 
the UTC time hack given in the pre-flight brief. 
Mission Rule   
FT3-
17 
The test run will be aborted if any aircraft is off 
altitude by more than 50 ft toward other aircraft 
inside 1 minute to CPA. 
FTP, Standard Hazard 
Mitigation, FT3-01 
 
FT3-
18 
A 200-foot minimum vertical separation shall be 
maintained for all test geometries. 
Mission Rule  
FT3-
19 
Flight operations outside of the approved mission 
flight envelope for Ikhana are prohibited during test 
encounters  
FT3-14   
FT3-
20 
A side-by-side altitude calibration will be 
performed between aircraft for any mission that 
includes an encounter less than 500-ft vertical 
separation.  
Mission Rule  
Applicable to 
Configuration 
1a and 1b 
 
Table 6 lists the mission rules applicable to Configuration 2 flights. Since Ikhana was not participating, the list is 
significantly reduced and supplanted with platform specific flight manual operational limitations. 
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Table 6. Configuration 2 mission rules. 
 
Rule 
# 
Rule description – flight Rationale/hazard report Notes 
FT3 Configuration 2 Specific  
FT3-
1 
Test runs will be conducted in VMC with inflight 
visibility at least 3 statute miles. 
Standard Hazard Mitigation  
FT3-
2 
Test runs will be conducted clear of clouds and with 
at least 1000-ft cloud clearance above and below 
the planned test block, including abort maneuvers. 
FTP, Standard Hazard 
Mitigation 
  
FT3-
4 
At the beginning of each test run, pilots will check 
their navigational system accuracy; runs with less 
than 500-ft vertical separation will be aborted if the 
predicted error exceeds 0.1 nmi. 
FTP, Mission Rule, FT3-01, 
FT3-02 
Acceptable 
error is 0.1 nmi 
FT3-
9 
For all test encounters where vertical separation is 
less than 500 ft, the test run will be aborted if all 
manned aircraft do not have visual on all encounter 
aircraft at any point inside 1 nmi separation. 
FTP, Hazard Mitigation 
Lateral and 
Vertical vectors 
may be applied 
prior to an abort 
to maintain 
applicable 
separation.   
FT3-
12 
The manned intruder pilot will not follow a TCAS 
contrary to the pre-briefed abort procedures unless 
they have reason to believe the RA is generated by 
non-participating traffic and they have SA on 
ownship position. 
FTP, Hazard Mitigation  
FT3-
16 
Confirm each aircraft’s nav system time matches 
the UTC time hack given in the pre-flight brief. 
Mission Rule   
FT3-
18 
A 200-ft minimum vertical separation shall be 
maintained for all test geometries. 
Mission Rule  
FT3-
21 
Intentional ownship vertical maneuvers towards 
intruder aircraft shall not be made within 
60 seconds of CPA during live intruder encounters. 
Mission Rule  
 
Additionally, during all FT3 flights a senior operations representative (SOR) was required to be present in the 
SAF. The SOR acted as a spokesperson for the NASA AFRC Director of Flight Operations and their responsibility 
was to monitor general conduct of the flight-test operations, monitor the team’s real-time decisions, and initiate the 
Aircraft Incident Response Procedure in the case of an aircraft mishap. 
IV. Flight Execution 
The Flight Test Series 3 was split into two distinct phases: Pairwise Encounters (Configuration 1) and FM 
Encounters (Configuration 2).  
To test the multiple cases that a UAS could encounter using the specific SUT in the NAS, a variety of encounters 
were planned for every stakeholder. For each scenario, an intruder(s) would fly towards the ownship at a relative angle 
against the ownship path. The angles were chosen to test the full capability of each of the equipped sensors, with 
angles designed as far as the radar azimuth could reach. Encounters also tested the fidelity of the systems to sense 
changes in altitude. Several permutations included the ownship or intruder climbing or descending while the other 
stayed in level flight, or a double “blunder” maneuver. Each type of maneuver had its own objective for SS or CA.  
An extensive flight-test matrix was created to track over 300 unique encounters. The matrix included information 
on which SUT was being tested, angles of the intruder(s), groundspeeds, altitudes, initial points (IP), CPA, flight path 
coordinates, priority, sensors selected, tolerances, and other pertinent information. The flight-test matrix was designed 
to automatically populate FT3 flight cards with this information. Additionally, a wind adjust matrix for CPA timing 
was created for encounters requiring to fly an airspeed (as opposed to groundspeed). 
Coordination between the ownship, SAF, and intruder for timing at CPA and individual maneuver requirements 
from the SUT researchers was critical for mission success. Mission briefs (involving all aircraft crew and test support 
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personnel) and training were performed prior to each Configuration 1 flight due to the unique nature of daily 
encounters. These briefs/training were imperative in the success of Configuration 1.  
A. Configuration 1: Pairwise Encounters 
This test configuration evaluated the advisories generated by the SS and CA Algorithms fed by data from live 
aircraft during flight. Flight Test Configuration 1 was further defined into two distinct groups, Configuration 1a and 
1b. Configuration 1a involved flight-test encounters using the NASA Ikhana aircraft as the low-speed ownship. 
Configuration 1b planned for use of a high-speed ownship aircraft. However, the aircraft planned for Configuration 
1b ultimately could not support the FT3 event.  
In these tests the Ikhana ownship aircraft was flown against either one or two manned intruder aircraft. Both SS 
and CA algorithms were evaluated. The SS algorithms were evaluated using both mitigated and unmitigated 
encounters. Unmitigated, also known as fly-through and non-maneuvering encounters, were designed for each aircraft 
to fly the route as planned all the way to the CPA regardless of the alerting displayed. These encounters evaluated 
each SUT ability to estimate trajectories, predict miss distances at CPA, and generate proper alerting and maneuver 
guidance. The mitigated encounters were designed for the test aircrew to maneuver the ownship aircraft away from 
the Collision Avoidance Threshold (CAT) or Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) thresholds and maintain a well-clear 
distance between intruder and ownship. Table 7 categorizes each SUT. 
 
Table 7. Breakdown of SUTs for Configuration 1, with primary and secondary objectives and types of 
maneuvers noted. 
 
 
 
Based on requirements from researchers, a nomenclature was developed to capture the needs of each scenario. The 
name of each encounter included four parts:  
 Type of encounter (low speed, high speed, or multiship). 
 Altitude offset between the ownship and intruder(s) (If multiship, the smaller vertical profile would be 
represented). 
 Vertical profile.  
 Angle of the intruder flying relative to the ownship path (For some letter indices, two angles were defined to 
accommodate multiship encounters). 
The full set of nomenclature definitions are shown in Fig. 8. This nomenclature would help define and distinguish 
encounters, and give a quick, simple assessment of the type of encounter being performed. 
1. Configuration 1a Low-Speed Ownship 
Configuration 1a encounters used a low-speed ownship (<210 KGS). Some of these encounters (noted) consisted 
of a high-speed intruder (≥210 KGS). 
a. ARC (AutoResolver) Pairwise Encounter Geometries – The ARC low-speed ownship Pairwise Encounters were 
designed to test the AutoResolver/JADEM algorithm. The algorithm was further divided into two, AutoResolver 1 
and 2, with different alerting thresholds. ARC encounters were divided in three types: fly-through/maneuvering 
climbs/descents/level (Fig. 9), fly-through alerting TCAS (Fig. 10), and high-speed intruder. The vertical profiles for 
the fly-through/maneuvering encounters is shown in Fig.11. The following is an explanation of each. 
Aircraft in the fly-through scenarios flew toward a target CPA of 0-nmi horizontal offset. Actual CPA was not 
critical since any CPA could be compared to the CPA predictions. It was desirable, however, to fly close enough to 
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trigger a SS alert. The maneuver encounters were scenarios in which the pilot maneuvered the aircraft as directed by 
the specific SS display. 
These fly-through/maneuvering encounters tested various angles into: 0°, 45°, 90°, 110°, 180°, and a 45° and 90° 
blunder. All encounters had a minimum 1,000-ft vertical separation that was offset artificially within the algorithm, 
so as to make the ownship and intruder appear co-altitude. 
The TCAS/Self Assurance/Sense and Avoid Interoperability (SSI) encounters were designed to evaluate 
interoperability between TCAS and SS systems. SS systems are expected to keep the ownship well clear of an intruder. 
Although well clear is not specifically defined to avoid alerting the intruder TCAS; alerting TCAS can generally be 
considered not well clear. Ideally, the SS alert would trigger long before the TCAS alert. 
These encounters were designed simply as a fly-through to gather data. Because the vertical profile was planned 
to go as close as 300 ft, a build-up approach was used; the encounters were flown first at 1,000 ft, then 500 ft, and 
finally, 300 ft. To stay consistent, all of these encounters employed the 3,000-ft lateral separation (although only the 
300-ft encounters required the lateral offset). These encounters had an angle into of 0°, 45°, and 90°. 
The vertical profiles for all of ARC low-speed intruder encounters is shown in Fig. 11. For the fly-
through/maneuver encounters, angles 0°, 45°, and 90° required climb/descent airspeed as opposed to groundspeed, 
and are explained in detail later in this paper. Angles 110°, 180°, turning 45°, and turning 90° had 1,000-ft vertical 
separation. Fly-through alerting TCAS had 1,000-ft, 500-ft, and 300-ft separation. 
As mentioned, ARC required cases with a high-speed intruder to mimic jet aircraft conditions. The angles for these 
encounters were 0°, 45°, 90°, and overtaking 180°. These encounters were done both as a fly-through and a maneuver 
performed with required 1,000-ft vertical separation, shown in Fig. 12. 
b. ARC Indicated Airspeed Encounter Wind Matrix – ARC required some of their encounters to be run with 
indicated airspeed. Thus, a wind matrix was used to correlate to the established test paradigm of flying with 
groundspeed. To validate the ARC simulation results for AutoResolver/JADEM, a slightly different approach was 
required for their climbing and descending encounters. Because their simulations were built using KIAS as opposed 
to knots groundspeed (KGS), the researcher requested that all of these climb/descent encounters be flown with a 
constant airspeed. However, this posed a problem for CPA timing. All other encounters were designed with 
groundspeed in mind, so that daily variable winds aloft would not affect the timing of the encounter. To mitigate this 
problem for the ARC climb/descent encounters, a wind adjust matrix was built to help with timing and variable winds. 
As depicted in Table 8, the wind adjust matrix used a spreadsheet format to calculate relative timing from the IP. 
Each series of climb/descent encounters (L13, L14, L15, and L16) were designed to start at a specific altitude. Using 
this altitude, a knots true airspeed (KTAS) was calculated for the desired airspeed. Once current winds were input 
(green boxes, wind speed, and wind direction) simple trigonometry was used to show the headwind the aircraft would 
experience for that encounter based on encounter angle. Distance adjust value was then calculated (more or less 
distance traveled for the encounter) based on headwind and the leg length. Although the researcher originally wished 
to communicate this distance adjust to the pilots, operationally it made more sense to communicate a time adjust. 
Therefore, two additional values were calculated: the groundspeed the aircraft would experience based on the 
headwind and true airspeed at altitude, and finally a time adjust was calculated using the simple formula time = 
distance/rate, using the distance adjust and groundspeed. 
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Table 8. ARC wind adjust matrix. 
 
 
 
For each of the encounters of this type, the TC would ask the winds aloft for the climbing or descending aircraft. 
The values were input into the matrix, and the spreadsheet would automatically calculate a time adjust from the IP. 
The TC would then communicate this value back to the airborne players. A positive value indicated to the aircraft to 
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begin the descent that many seconds after IP crossing. A negative value indicated to the aircraft to begin the descent 
that many seconds before the IP crossing.  
During later flights and for simplicity, values were adjusted to be called out in increments of 5 seconds since the 
aircrew found this solution to be easier to implement while performing the dynamic encounters. This compromise led 
to successful climb/descent encounters and the researcher received good data when the matrix was used correctly. 
c. LaRC (Stratway+) Pairwise Encounter Geometries – NASA LaRC provided SS encounters to test and collect 
data on the SS algorithm Stratway+ (now called Detect & AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems 
(DAIDALUS)). The LaRC series of maneuvering scenarios was designed to collect data to validate CPA predictions 
and validate the Stratway+ solution well-clear band data during live flight-test conditions. The encounters also 
operated on the edge of the TCAS resolution advisory (RA) envelope and ensured Stratway+ guidance provided 
maneuver bands to operate outside the RA envelope of TCAS II. Most encounters were set at 3,000-ft lateral planned 
CPA with 400- or 500-ft vertical offset. 
All of the LaRC encounters required a lateral maneuver (mitigated) and were divided into low-speed ownship 
level/climb/descent/double blunder (Figs. 13, 14, and 15), low-speed intruder multiship (Figs. 16, 17, and 18), high-
speed intruder (Fig. 19), and high-speed intruder multiship (Figs. 20 and 21). 
Encounter geometries were flown at 0°, 20°, 45°, 90°, and 135° angle into. The 135° geometry was of particular 
interest to evaluate the effectiveness of Stratway+ in a late intruder discovery scenario where radar is operating at the 
edge of its azimuth. Multiple runs were conducted with varying sensor selections. 
Vertical maneuvers represented further evaluation of the Stratway+ algorithm performance and also engaged the 
TCAS II RA envelope. Additionally, a double blunder encounter was added for FT3, to gauge the solution space of 
Stratway+. Climb/descent encounters had a 500-ft vertical separation and required a 1,000-fpm climb or descent. 
The multiple intruder series of scenarios were designed to constrain the solution space presented to the pilot and 
to evaluate the Stratway+ solution well-clear band data. Stratway+ was designed to present well-clear maneuver space 
as the union of all threats and a solution space which provides guidance well clear of all intruders. These scenarios 
increased the complexity of the solution band data presented to the pilot as there were solutions which were 
constrained to either side of the aircraft course. For an SAA system to operate effectively in the NAS, it must be able 
to solve a multiple intruder scenario even though this type of setup may be a very low probability situation.  
All multiship encounters had a 500-ft vertical separation between ownship and intruder, and all were level 
flight/level maneuvers to introduce the first stage of this complexity which is planned to be continued in Flight Test 
(FT) 4. The multiship encounters included several permutations: 0°/0°, 20°/-20°, 0°/45°, 45°/90°, 0°/90°, 0°/135°, and 
90°/135° angles into, as depicted in Figs. 16, 17, and 18. 
The high-speed intruder encounter series of scenarios were designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the Stratway+ 
algorithm when engaging intruders operating at speeds typically encountered with commercial jet transport aircraft 
transiting below Class A airspace. The increased intruder speed shortened the available pilot reaction time and 
provided faster closure while the ownship started to execute the maneuver to remain well clear. It was also of interest 
to evaluate if alerting times effective at lower closure rates with slower intruders would remain sufficient with higher 
closure speeds. 
For Stratway+, high-speed intruder encounters were performed at 400-ft vertical separation and at angles into of 
0°, 45°, 90°, and 135° (Fig. 19). Additionally, multiship encounters were performed with a high-speed intruder with 
500-ft vertical separation. These encounters’ permutations include: 0°/45°, 0°/90°, and 0°/135°. Figures 20 and 21 
detail the high-speed and low-speed intruder for each. 
d. General Atomics CPDS Pairwise Encounter Geometries – General Atomics provided their SS algorithm, CPDS, 
TCAS type encounters, and radar encounters. The first group of encounters that was provided from General Atomics 
was to test the SS algorithm CPDS. Five single intruder encounters were provided for CPDS: one at 400-ft vertical 
separation and four at 500-ft vertical separation. Each of these encounters, all low speed, had the intruder performing 
a 45° standard rate turn blunder into the path of the ownship. 
CPDS also required three multiship encounters. Each featured an intruder performing a 45° standard rate turn 
blunder into the path of the ownship, as well as a second intruder constraining the solution space. These encounters 
were designed with the first intruder at 400 ft above ownship and the second at 500 ft below ownship. The following 
is a detailed description of the encounters and their main objectives, which is summarized in Table 9. 
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Table 9. CPDS objective and encounter overview. 
 
 
    
CPDS Objectives – The CPDS researcher provided a characteristic set of objectives that created complex 
geometries unique to the encounters of this algorithm. 
1) Test the current system/algorithms beyond the situation in which an intruder traverses the various SS alert states 
in the way that would happen if the conflict geometry already exists outside of the temporal limit defining Self-
Separation Proximate Traffic (SSPT). 
 Objective 1a: Test the system for situations in which well clear is resolved by intruder maneuver while having 
status Corrective Self-Separation Alert (CSSA) before Self-Separation Warning Alert (SSWA) occurs. Loss 
of well clear is predicted and after the intruder alert status has become Self-Separation Corrective Alert 
(SSCA), the intruder maneuvers in such a way that well clear will not be violated. 
 Objective 1b: Test the system for situations in which an intruder becomes CSSA due to a maneuver within 
the 75-25 seconds to the well-clear boundary. In these situations the predictability in terms of time remaining 
until SSWA cannot be deduced from the time the yellow band intersected the ownship track or the time traffic 
became SSCA. 
 Objective 1c: Test the system for situations in which the intruder SS alert state due to a maneuver cycles 
from normal to CSSA to normal. 
2) Same objectives as Objective 1, but with an additional constraint on the solution space. 
 Objective 2a: Test the system for situations in which well clear is resolved by intruder maneuver while having 
status CSSA (before SSWA occurs). Loss of well clear is predicted and after the intruder alert status has 
become SSCA, the intruder maneuvers in such a way that well clear will not be violated. 
 Objective 2b: Test the system for situations in which an intruder becomes CSSA due to a maneuver within 
the 75-25 seconds to the well-clear boundary. In these situations the predictability in terms of time remaining 
until SSWA cannot be deduced from the time the yellow band intersected the ownship track or the time traffic 
became SSCA. 
 Objective 2c: Test the system for situations in which the intruder SS alert state, due to a maneuver, transitions 
from normal to CSSA to normal. 
3) Test the conflict probe function for the most opposite impacts of wind on the same conflict geometry. 
Desired UAS Pilot Performance – A pilot’s response to the display is also critical in evaluating the algorithm. The 
desired UAS pilot performance in the task of remaining well clear comprises two aspects: 
1) Timely detection of all conflicts (future loss of well clear) that will require a maneuver to prevent them from 
occurring unless the intruder resolves it in time, and appropriate execution of the maneuver (timing and magnitude) 
that prevents the otherwise occurring well-clear violation. 
2) A minimum of unnecessary maneuvering; minimum maneuvers are significant for the prevention of: 
 Situations in which the pilot initiates a maneuver to remain well clear whereas the continuation of the current 
direction and velocity would not have resulted in a loss of well clear. 
 Situations in which ownship maneuvers due to a temporary predicted loss of well clear outside the 85-second 
threshold use for the SSPT. 
 Situations in which the maneuver performed by the pilot to remain well clear is far more severe than 
necessary. 
Requirements for CPDS Conflict Geometries (Fig. 22) – Given the objectives, the following three types of 
encounters were needed: 
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1) To meet the first two subparts of objective 1: Encounters that are predicted to result in a loss of well clear at a 
time to CPA larger than 120 seconds, but are resolved by the intruder maneuvering between 75 and 25+ to be 
determined (TBD) margin seconds to well clear. 
2) To meet the second subpart of objective 1 and second subpart of objective 2: Encounters in which the intruder 
maneuvers within 110 seconds to CPA in such a way that the predicted distance at CPA crosses the well-clear 
Distance MODification (DMOD) threshold. 
3) To meet the third subpart of objective 1 and third subpart of objective 2: Encounters that only during the 
maneuver of the intruder cause a predicted loss of well clear with a time to CPA that always remains above 
60 seconds. 
Requirements for the second intruder (Fig. 23) – To meet objective 2, the trajectory for the second intruder must 
meet the following requirements: 
1) The second intruder is not used to generate a geometry which causes a predicted loss of well clear. 
2) The second intruder is not intended to maneuver, unless necessitated by an (unplanned) maneuver of Ikhana. 
3) The second intruder is to be positioned in such a way that during the encounter with intruder 1 (with ‘during’ 
defined as the period Ikhana being at least from 120 seconds to moment until the predicted loss of well clear with 
intruder 1 occurs), the intruder will be a Preventative Self-Separation Alert (PSSA) (using the proposed update to 
the PSSA specification). 
4) The second intruder is to be positioned in such a way that within 10 seconds of the start of a standard rate turn 
to the left of Ikhana, the PSSA becomes CSSA. 
e. General Atomics Radar Pairwise Encounter Geometries – The next set of encounters provided by General 
Atomics were designed to test the Engineering Development Module (EDM) DRR. Test encounter geometries 
provided by GA-ASI collected data on the performance of the company provided EDM radar system and to help 
inform the SC-228 radar working group MOPS. The EDM radar performance operating at low altitudes was unknown, 
thus during FT3, test encounters were planned to explore how the radar performs at low altitude with ground clutter 
affecting target resolution. Figure 24 depicts the planned low altitude radar flight-test geometries. The minimum test 
altitude was 1,000-ft AGL based off the highest ground feature located along the flight path of the encounter. Both 
the ownship (Ikhana) and the intruder performed 1,000-ft AGL runs, but at no time did an encounter participant operate 
below 1,000 ft. Eight low altitude radar runs were planned. All low altitude encounters performed had a vertical 
separation of 1,000 ft, 3,000-ft lateral offset, and were all flown head-on. 
Further, GA-ASI required performance testing of the EDM radar to determine targeting capabilities at the azimuth 
limits of the radar system (Fig. 25), performance of the system of the radar when the intruder is persisting on the beam 
(Fig. 26), as well as, system performance of the radar during intruder acceleration maneuvering called a “Zig-Zag” 
encounter (Fig. 27). 
Constant bearing, decreasing range (CBDR) encounters for radar held the intruder at a relative angle of either 110° 
or 90° bearing to the ownship. These encounters were longer than most, being flown for 5 or 6 minutes to collect 
additional radar data. The encounters included climbs and descents with 500-ft vertical separation, and were performed 
in level flight with a minimum of 300-ft vertical separation. 
The Zig-Zig encounter, although depicted with defined angles in Fig. 27, could change during the flight; as long 
as the aircraft were continuously accelerating, researchers would be receiving the data they required. This encounter 
was flown with 1,000-ft vertical separation. 
f. General Atomics TCAS Pairwise Encounter Geometries – General Atomics provided simple to complex TCAS 
type encounters. The CA performance encounters were designed to test the full range of TCAS Resolution Advisories 
(i.e., preventive and corrective) and when executed automatically, to test the performance of the vehicle response in a 
real world environment. Climbing/descending ownship and intruders were included to capture realistic encounter 
dynamics of the Phase I DAA MOPS definition of transition. These encounters also served to capture radar 
performance data all the way through a CA maneuver.  
Figures 28 and 29 depict the mitigated single intruder TCAS runs that were designed to further investigate the 
threshold between collision avoidance and SS boundaries. Runs were planned in a variety of geometries and used a 
buildup approach starting with 500-ft vertical separation and building up to 300-ft vertical separation encounters, 
running in advisory and then automatic (AUTO) mode. Vertical blunder type maneuvers were planned with ownship 
maneuvers, intruder maneuvers, and some encounters where both ownship and intruder perform vertical maneuvering 
toward each other with a minimum of 500-ft separation at the completion of the encounter. Angles into for these 
encounters included 0°, 20°, 45°, 90°, 135°, and 160°. 
Several of the CA performance encounters included multiple threat aircraft. While not traditional “multi-threat” 
encounters as defined by TCAS, these encounters were designed to generate TCAS RAs one at a time or sequentially. 
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These encounters did not directly test the TCAS multi-threat logic, but were designed to test the dynamics of multiple 
TCAS RAs generated in different directions. The encounter was timed to induce one TCAS RA, followed by a “clear 
of conflict,” followed by another RA in the opposite direction to the first. These encounters were the most complex to 
be tested during FT3. A buildup approach was used for this type starting at 300-ft vertical separation with Ikhana 
operating in advisory mode. Once the 300-ft encounter had been cleared in advisory, the encounter would be 
performed in AUTO mode at 300-ft vertical separation. Once 300-ft encounters were cleared, 200-ft vertical separation 
would be tested using the same buildup approach. As mentioned later in this paper, researchers stated on the flight 
day that advisory only 300-ft encounters were suitable for their data collection (thus only M67Q and M68Q were 
performed, and in advisory mode). Figure 30 shows the planned top view of these TCAS multiship sequential 
encounters, and Figs. 31 and 32 show the vertical profile views. 
2. Configuration 1b High-Speed Ownship 
Configuration 1b encounters required a high-speed ownship (≥210 KGS). Unfortunately due to time constraints 
and unavailability of the high-speed ownship, these encounters were not completed. 
In addition to low-speed encounters, ARC desired pairwise encounter geometries in the high-speed category to 
test the AutoResolver algorithm. A high-speed ownship (210 and 250 KGS) was necessary to test the limits of their 
algorithm, with a low-speed (130 KGS) intruder. The planned angles into for this configuration were 0°, 45°, 90°, and 
an overtaking 180°, seen in Fig. 33. The high-speed encounters would test the fly-through (unmitigated) case, as well 
as maneuvering based on algorithm directive (mitigated). All high-speed ownship scenarios had planned 1,000-ft 
vertical separation for safety. 
3. Matrix Development 
A comprehensive flight-test matrix was built for FT3 based on researcher requirements and the geometries 
described above. The encounters were grouped into sections by their encounter angle or type: head on 0°, 45°, 90°, 
135°, high-speed participant, radar, TCAS, and CPDS.  
Originally, researchers from LaRC, ARC, and General Atomics each provided their own set of maneuvers and 
requirements in spreadsheet format. These requirements were consolidated into one matrix by personnel at LaRC, and 
this spreadsheet was inherited by AFRC and extensively expanded upon. Flight planning by AFRC began with this 
version, gathering requirements for the type of maneuver being performed, altitudes, groundspeeds, and sensors. 
The purpose of the matrix was to provide a centralized spreadsheet to input all required research geometries, plan 
the flight in the approved airspace, and populate the flight cards with information and requirements for each encounter. 
The matrix was built in Microsoft Excel® (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Washington) and used Visual Basic 
for Applications (VBA) (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Washington) for calculating pertinent values, such as GPS 
coordinates in multiple formats. Look-up tables were used on several occasions and especially to populate Ikhana lost-
link mission for each encounter based on CPA. Additionally, Excel was useful for calculating IP to maneuver point 
(MP) and CPA using dead-reckoning equations. The following is a breakdown of the parameters, some of which are 
shown in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Pairwise encounters scenario matrix. 
 
 
 
 Scenario number (S/N): The scenario number (Table 10) was the most critical number for each encounter. 
This number served as an identification number for the unique geometry, flight altitude, and other relevant 
information. Although encounters could have the same scenario name, the number was unique. The S/N was 
used throughout the entire flight test, from the matrix for building the encounter, to encounter prioritization, 
and finally, for creating the flight-test cards. 
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 Scenario name: Scenario names (Table 10) were based on the pairwise encounters nomenclature. The 
scenario name was a quick reference to gain SA on what type of encounter was being performed. The scenario 
number could be the same for two or more encounters. 
 Scenario name (old nomenclature): Previously, encounters had a naming convention developed from 
researchers at ARC. Later, the naming convention was refined and modified to the version currently being 
used. The old nomenclature was kept on the matrix as a trace to the original required encounter. 
 Ownship (OWN) True Course: This value was used to calculate GPS coordinates (magnetic course was later 
calculated on the flight cards themselves). 
 Leg time: Time for the encounter from Commence Exercise (COMEX); leg time (Table 10) included some 
buffer for setting up the encounter geometry. Most encounters had 3-minute legs, with some maneuvering 
encounters (3.25 minutes, 3.5 minutes), low altitude radar (3.5 minutes), and CBDR radar (5 minutes, 
6 minutes).  
 Minimum vertical separation: Smallest vertical separation between ownship and intruder(s) for the encounter 
at CPA (Table 10); if the vertical separation necessary for an encounter was ≤500 ft, a lateral offset was 
required for safety. 
 Angle into: Relative angle of the intruder(s) into the ownship for that geometry (Table 10); this value was 
used to calculate GPS coordinates. 
 Lateral offset: A lateral offset (Table 10) of half a nautical mile (~3,000 ft) was calculated into the geometry 
for encounters with a vertical separation of ≤500 ft. The offset was to ensure that if a visual was not acquired 
according to mission rule, there would still be a safety buffer. 
 Ground Speed (GS) OWN: Groundspeed of the ownship in knots (Table 10); depending on what the 
researcher wanted to test, the groundspeed varied between encounters. Most low-speed encounters had a GS 
of 130 or 150 KGS. High-speed encounters required an ownship GS of ≥210 KGS. Groundspeed was 
preferred for calculations since it did not have to take wind into account. For some encounters, an airspeed 
of 120 KIAS was required. GPS coordinates were provided for these encounters from the researcher 
 GS Intruder 1 (INT1): Most encounters required the intruder(s) (Table 10) to fly at 150 or 180 KGS. For 
high-speed encounters, intruders were required to fly ≥210 KGS. For some encounters, an airspeed of 
140 KIAS was required. 
 GS Intruder 2 (INT2): Multiship encounters only had low-speed intruders (Table 10) for Flight Test Series 3. 
Thus, all intruder 2 groundspeeds were 150 or 180 KGS. 
 Ownship initial altitude: Altitudes chosen for each encounter (Table 10) took Ikhana and intruder flight 
performance into consideration, as well as airspace. Encounters began 10K-20K ft MSL. Low altitude radar 
encounters took the highest point on the terrain (3,200 ft MSL) and added 1,000 ft for the flight level. Thus 
4,200 ft MSL was the lowest flown altitude. 
 Ownship vertical velocity: For some encounters, a climb or descent was required by the ownship (Table 10). 
Rates required were either 1,000 fpm (climb) or -1,000 fpm (descent).  
 Ownship final altitude: Once more, the final altitude (Table 10) was within the block of 10K-20K ft MSL or 
1,000 ft above the highest terrain point. 
 INT1 initial altitude: The initial altitude (Table 10) of INT1 was identical to the ownship. 
 INT1 vertical velocity: The vertical velocity (Table 10) of INT1 was identical to the ownship. 
 INT1 final altitude: The final altitude (Table 10) of INT1 was identical to the ownship. 
 INT2 initial altitude: The initial altitude (Table 10) of INT2 was identical to the ownship. 
 INT2 vertical velocity: The vertical velocity (Table 10) of INT2 was identical to the ownship. 
 INT2 final altitude: The final altitude (Table 10) of INT2 was identical to the ownship. 
 CPA OWN: The CPA of the ownship was one of its most important parameters. The CPA was the point 
where the ownship and intruder(s) would be nearest in space for each encounter. Within R-2515, 11 different 
ownship CPAs were chosen for all Pairwise Encounters. CPAs were chosen to accommodate for the 3-minute 
legs in the airspace (as well as the longer radar legs), plan sun angles for manned intruders, and were used to 
build the Ikhana lost-link mission. Additionally, the CPAs made it easier to group encounters based on 
matching CPA when building these geometries in Zeus for SAF SA. Finally, the CPAs were used in a lookup 
table to build GPS coordinates for all geometries. 
 CPA OWN latitude/longitude: Chosen latitude and longitude for each CPA in decimal degrees (DD) format. 
The CPA latitude/longitude was found using FalconView (FV). 
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 IP OWN: The IP of the ownship was chosen to fit within the airspace and to accommodate for the 3-minute 
(or longer) legs. The IP served as the point where the encounter would start and where the aircraft needed to 
be at the COMEX. Each IP had an identification number based on its coordinates, and for encounters that 
used the same IP, an identical IP identification (ID) was used. The IP was also used on the flight cards for 
reference on the top view (Fig. 34) and coordinates. 
 IP OWN latitude/longitude: Calculated latitude and longitude of the ownship IP from the CPA using dead 
reckoning equations, in DD format. 
 IP OWN distance meaning equipment (DME): Calculated distance in nautical miles from the CPA to the IP 
for ownship. 
 IP intruder: The same procedure was used for the intruder IP as for the ownship. 
 IP INT latitude/longitude: Calculated latitude and longitude of the IP for the intruder from the CPA in DD 
format. 
 IP INT DME: Calculated distance in nautical miles from the CPA to the IP for intruder. 
 CPA INT: Similar to the ownship, the CPAs for the intruder were also grouped based on GPS coordinates. 
However, since the geometries for the intruders were built around the geometries for the ownship, there were 
many more CPAs for intruders than for the ownship due to various angles into, groundspeeds, et cetera. 
 CPA INT lattitude/longitude: Calculated latitude and longitude of the intruder CPA in DD. The CPA for the 
intruder was either the same as the ownship (˃500-ft vertical separation) or calculated to be 3,000 ft away 
(≤500-ft vertical separation) from ownship CPA using the relative angle into. 
 MP INT: For some encounters, a maneuver was required in the middle of the encounter for the intruder to 
create a blunder type scenario. Maneuver points once again held the same ID if they had the same GPS 
coordinates. 
 MP INT latitude/longitude: Calculated latitude and longitude in DD that the intruder was expected to begin 
the standard rate turn to the CPA. 
 On condition: Each encounter required that the aircraft be on condition (Table 10) a certain number of 
seconds from CPA. The on condition was to ensure that the researcher’s algorithm would have enough time 
to pick up the aircraft in the encounter for the required conditions (speeds, altitudes, vertical speed, et cetera). 
Most encounters had a requirement of being on condition for 2.5 minutes (0.5 minutes for setting up) for the 
total 3-minute legs required. 
 Tolerance: A carryover from the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) Xu flight test; the tolerance 
(Table 10) for an encounter was the number of seconds that each aircraft could be away from the CPA and 
still achieve the correct alerting for that encounter. Most encounters had a timing of ±5, 8, or 10 seconds. 
This value was determined from simulation by the researchers or from previous experience. As time went 
on, it became apparent that tolerance was not as critical for FT3 (especially for the maneuvering encounters) 
as much as achieving stable conditions. 
 Ikhana lost link: In the event that Ikhana would lose link, a lost-link mission (Table 10) was programmed 
into the flight computer. The lost-link mission was based on the CPA the ownship would be heading to for 
that encounter. For this reason, it was critical for the Ikhana team to have all CPAs prior to flight testing so 
they could build this mission. The lost-link mission was input into the flight matrix using a lookup table 
based on CPA. 
It is important to note that once all geometries were built, they were geo-referenced in FV to ensure they fit in the 
assigned airspace or gave enough maneuverability space for all aircraft participants. If they did not, the CPA and GPS 
coordinates were iterated until a suitable geometry was achieved. 
The flight-test matrix also included a section showing the scenario number, priority, and what sensors would be 
required for that encounter. Encounters for a particular flight day were chosen in this way. Thus the matrix provided 
the basic requirements for execution, safety mitigation, and prioritization for planned FT3 scenarios. 
4. Flight Card Description 
Flight cards for Configuration 1 were developed based on cards created during the ACAS Xu flight test by 
personnel from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory (Lexington, Massachusetts). These 
flight cards, which were atypical, were used for similar type encounters during that flight test. 
Due to the success of that program and card clarity, a similar format was used for Flight Test Series 3. With the 
collaborative effort of FT3 Ikhana Operations, AFRC IT&E Operations, and researcher input; the product was 
designed to provide a simple, easy to use, and easily modifiable card that met researcher requirements for mission 
28 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
success. The cards also presented a familiar format to that of an instrument approach plate which enabled the aircrew 
to quickly determine test parameters and critical flight information. 
An additional factor that was taken into the design was that of human factors: throughout all scenario cards for 
Configuration 1, a standard color format was selected: 
 Ownship and middle altitude aircraft was green. 
 Intruder 1 and higher altitude aircraft was red.  
 Intruder 2 and lower altitude aircraft was blue. 
This color scheme was chosen for its quick SA for the customer and easy cockpit use. The issue of color blindness 
was considered, but since all of the test pilots had been through physical examination that checks for color blindness, 
it was a non-factor. 
The flight cards were a tremendous success, both visually and for being highly informative and practical. Kudos 
were received from Ikhana and guest aircrew, intruder aircrew, and industry stakeholders alike. 
Flight Cards were built in Excel and were directly linked to the flight-test matrix. The matrix had the capability of 
auto-populating much of the information for the card based on look-up tables from the scenario number: IP/CPA 
names and coordinates, altitudes, headings, velocities, distances, groundspeeds, lost-link mission for Ikhana, on-
condition timing, and CPA tolerances. Manual input was required for the sensor selection, deconfliction altitudes, 
notes, and abort procedures. 
The top down view is a geo-referenced image that was built in FV, and furthermore auto-generated by a program 
called Excel2FV. Excel2FV plotted and created FV files automatically by taking user-grouped identical geometries 
from Excel as an input. Once the geometries/files were created, IP/CPA icons were manually added onto the FV files 
and an image file was created. These image files were moved to Microsoft PowerPoint® (Microsoft Corporation, 
Redmond, Washington) and aircraft icons added. The top-down views were then pasted onto the flight cards. 
Vertical profiles were built in Microsoft PowerPoint®. Groups of similar encounters were easily pasted onto the 
flight cards. 
The cards were designed to fit on an 8.5 in x 11 in sheet of paper, with one half dedicated to ownship and the other 
to intruder. The layout allowed users to either cut the deck in half or fold their card to the one of interest. For multiship, 
an additional sheet of standard size paper was required. 
Since there were over 200 test points, over 200 unique flight cards were created in this fashion for Configuration 1. 
Each flight card had its own spreadsheet and the cards were later converted into PDF, packaged into a document for 
that particular flight day, and distributed in soft- and hard-copy format to all FT3 participants. 
Figures 34 and 35 show an example of the flight cards used for Configuration 1. The following is a breakdown of 
card sections. 
a. Ownship – Ownship cards showed the aircraft route of flight as green. Below are the main card sections, listed 
alphabetically, and a brief explanation for each: 
 Abort altitude: This altitude is defined as the safe escape altitude the aircraft were expected to immediately 
hold and maintain if an abort is called. For the ownship, abort altitudes required no maneuver other than to 
remain level, or during climbs and descents to level off at the identified level-off altitude. The encounter 
would end if an abort was called. The abort altitude provided each participating aircraft at least 1,000 ft of 
vertical separation. 
 Abort heading: The abort heading is the heading to maintain or fly to in the case of an abort. The encounter 
would end if an abort was called. 
 Aircraft role: This section specified whether the aircraft was the ownship, Intruder 1, or Intruder 2. 
 Aircraft: The call sign of the aircraft for that test card is shown. 
 Card number: The card numbers were chosen the day of flight and represented the flight order. 
 Card type version: Cards went through several iterations before reaching their final version (9). The reason 
for versions was to keep track of all format updates made during the production of cards. Changes from 
version to version included additional information added to the top view, notes section added, updated 
encounter instructions, et cetera. 
 CPA: The CPA was the predicted point where the ownship and intruder(s) would be closest vertically and 
laterally. For encounters less than 500 ft in separation, this CPA had a 0.5 nmi lateral offset. Each CPA had 
a unique number (i.e. CPA7) and if GPS coordinates for a CPA repeated, the same CPA number would be 
used. The coordinates listed were in two forms for use by the Ikhana operators and intruders. CPAs were 
denoted by a triangle symbol. 
 COMEX: Each encounter had a COMEX, a time where all participants needed to be positioned at the IP or 
ready to commence the run. 
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 Configuration: The flight-test series configuration, for Configuration 1 consisted of two types: 1a (low-speed 
ownship) and 1b (high-speed ownship). 
 CPA tolerance: Tolerance was based on requirements from the researchers’ simulations. The tolerance 
required the aircraft to be at the CPA within that number of seconds from each other. Typically the value was 
±5, 8, or 10 seconds. 
 Deconfliction altitude: The deconfliction altitude was the altitude that the aircraft would fly in between test 
points. 
 Encounter instructions: These instructions were radio instructions as well as what to expect from the TC. The 
instructions also showed at least how much time the aircraft needed to be on condition for that run (step 3). 
On condition was typically 2.5, 3, or 3.5 minutes depending on the encounter length. 
 Final altitude: The final altitude was the expected altitude at the CPA. 
 Groundspeed: Encounter horizontal velocity parameter for all participating aircraft was included. For Flight 
Test Series 3, all speeds were constant (no acceleration). As mentioned, some encounters required airspeed; 
Airspeed was specified on those unique cards and highlighted. 
 Ikhana lost link: Each Ikhana CPA had a single waypoint on a lost-link mission that the aircraft would go to 
in the event of this condition. 
 IP: The IP was the point in space where the aircraft would need to be for COMEX. Each IP had a unique 
number (i.e. IP16), and if GPS coordinates for an IP repeated, the same IP number would be used. The 
coordinates listed were in two forms for use by the Ikhana operators and intruders. IPs were denoted by a 
square symbol. 
 IP to CPA in nautical miles: The distance between IP and CPA in nautical miles was included, for reference. 
 Magnetic course: Expected Magnetic Course (MC) was shown between the IP to CPA. 
 Ownship (O/S) pilot instructions: These instructions were specific to that geometry/SUT that the pilot had to 
execute. 
 Profile view: The profile view was the side view of the encounters, showing initial and final altitudes at IP 
and CPA respectively, abort procedures (dashed lines), and vertical separation. 
 Scenario name: This name was a quick reference to the type of encounter being executed, using the scenario 
nomenclature. For more information, see Fig. 8. 
 Scenario number: This number was unique to each encounter. In fact, it carried through from the flight-test 
matrix and was critical to building the cards based on lookup tables. For a full list of scenario numbers, see 
Table 10. 
 Sensor selected: Ikhana had several sensors that could be selected or deselected based on researcher 
requirements for that encounter. “Selected” meant that track data were being fed into the SUT. Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), radar, and/or TCAS data could be selected, as well as 
“Tracker,” which would fuse all three. 
 Start altitude: The start altitude is the aircraft starting altitude at the IP. 
 SUT: Each encounter had a particular display, or SUT. The choices were AutoResolver 1 or 2, Stratway+, or 
CPDS. 
 TCAS mode: The TCAS mode would be selected depending on if Ikhana should perform a maneuver based 
on TCAS alerts. “OFF” meant that no TCAS alerts would be received, “Advisory” would show the alerts to 
the pilot and let them decide whether to maneuver based on the guidance, and “AUTO” would enable the 
flight control computer to automatically take control and maneuver based on TCAS alerts. 
 Time adjust: The time adjust was useful for airspeed encounters.  
 Time hack: A time hack based off of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) as displayed in the SAF was 
performed prior to starting encounters. The time hack allowed all participants to sync up their clocks prior to 
COMEX. Time hack was called by the TC, and although each card had a section provided to record the hack, 
it was only performed once (for each aircraft) every flight day. 
 Top view: The top view was the geo-referenced top view of the encounter based off of FV showing what the 
ideal case would look like. CPA and IP are shown for the aircraft for that particular card. 
 Vertical velocity: The vertical velocity was the climb or descent rate of the aircraft in feet per minute. 
 VID notice: If an encounter was <500 ft in vertical separation, a notice was displayed on the top view to warn 
participants that a VID was required by 1 nmi lateral separation or an abort would be called. 
b. Intruder – Intruder cards showed the aircraft route of flight as either red (Intruder 1) or blue (Intruder 2). 
However, the cards were almost identical to the ownship cards: 
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 No sensor select: The intruder aircraft did not have the same sensor selection capabilities for inputting to the 
SUT; thus, this section was not required. 
 Intruder pilot instructions: These instructions varied from the ownship and gave SA to the pilot and how the 
ownship would be performing. 
 Maneuver point: The MP was the point the intruder aircraft was expected to fly to and then perform a standard 
rate turn to another set of coordinates. The MP was denoted by a circle symbol. The MP was not depicted on 
the example card. 
B. Configuration 2: Full Mission Encounters 
Full Mission flight encounters, also identified as Configuration 2, followed a pre-planned flight plan that represents 
a fictitious fireline route mission flown in Oakland Center Class E airspace (ZOA) that has been previously used for 
Integrated Human in the Loop (IHITL) and Full Mission simulation exercises conducted by researchers at NASA 
ARC. FT3 Full Mission would gather real flight data to improve simulation. In order to be successful, these encounters 
involved an even larger coordination effort than Configuration 1. Like Configuration 1, ownship and intruder aircraft 
needed to communicate on timing, weather, and airspace information. However, due to the integrated nature of 
Configuration 2, coordination with virtual ATC was required to conduct the virtual encounters. Although the data 
collection portion did not achieve the researchers’ desired results, from an operational perspective, the integration of 
RGCS pilot, virtual ATC, TC/TD, live ownship, and live intruders was smooth and nearly seamless. 
These missions involved a single ownship aircraft (UAS surrogate T-34C) navigating a flight plan, two live 
intruder aircraft performing flight encounters that were generally scripted, but had flexibility in execution to 
accommodate real-time changes during the test runs, and finally, multiple virtual intruders that were not displayed to 
the airborne aircrew, but the ownship aircraft maneuvered to avoid based off inputs executed by the subject pilot 
located in the RGCS. Each live intruder encounter with the UAS Surrogate ownship were 1v1 encounters. Figure 36 
shows the ownship fireline route and the expected paths and intercepts of the two live intruders (Intruder 1–red, 
Intruder 2–blue). Figure 37 shows the ownship, Intruder 1, and Intruder 2 routes overlaid, as well as expected live and 
virtual encounters. 
The NASA 608 aircraft acted as a surrogate UAS for this configuration. The aircraft was directly controlled 
laterally by the RGCS pilot, and the NASA 608 pilot would perform other maneuvers such as airspeed and altitude 
changes, received by the research computer from VSCS, and relayed to an on board tablet. To the RGCS pilot, the 
route appeared to be in ZOA airspace on the VSCS display. 
1. Fireline Route Development 
The following stakeholders helped develop the Configuration 2 event: 
 ARC: IT&E team members represented the virtual ATC team and the ARC HSI interests. They were 
responsible for integrating the route depicted above into ZOA airspace (Fig. 38) and with the restrictions 
required for flight in R-2508. 
 ARC: HSI team members were the primary research team. The encounter intercepts they developed would 
put the test pilot under heavy working conditions in order to evaluate the display. 
 AFRC: IT&E team members were responsible for local R-2508 and R-2515 coordination as well as overall 
flight execution. AFRC was responsible for relaying the information to ARC HSI/IT&E to create a temporary 
flight restriction (TFR) and slightly modify the fireline route on one waypoint. 
 R-2508 CCB: The Complex Control Board (CCB) is the governing body for the R-2508 complex and as such 
represented High Desert TRACON (Edwards, California) as well as USAF R-2515 interests.  
 GRC Communication: The GRC team was responsible for the T-34 NASA 608 aircraft during 
Configuration 2. 
2. Constraints and Limitations 
The Configuration 2 ownship was controlled by the RGCS, whose subject pilot under test was immersed in a 
virtual ATC, ZOA, and environment. Where aircrew in Configuration 1 flights maneuvered according to the display, 
aircrew in Configuration 2 coordinated with ATC as if they were actually operating an aircraft in the Oakland Center 
airspace. Furthermore, ownship maneuvers were less predictable in Configuration 2 and resulted in missed encounters 
as discussed later in this paper.  
Transiting from High Desert TRACON (Joshua) control to SPORT control needed prior coordination and in some 
cases imposed minor delays, on the order of minutes, while the controllers conducted hand overs. Although entry and 
31 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
use of the Isabella MOA was essentially guaranteed for participating aircraft with a Sage or Pancho clearance, entry 
into R-2515 was not guaranteed as NASA aircraft are assigned a lower priority than many USAF programs. 
3. Flight Card Description 
Due to its unique nature, full mission flight cards were completely developed by AFRC IT&E Operations for Flight 
Test Series 3. Because of the distinctive and repeating route for each flight day, one set of cards was created that was 
used every day: Ownship, Intruder 1, and Intruder 2. 
These cards were produced to be easy to use by the airborne users and other ground participants, not designed for 
the pilot using the SUT (RGCS). The cards were made to clearly show where live encounters were to occur, from 
what waypoints and holding patterns the intruder pilots should maneuver, and from where the ownship should expect 
fused reality virtual encounters. 
Using the same color scheme but reversed altitudes from Configuration 1: 
 Ownship and middle altitude aircraft were green. 
 Intruder 1 and lower altitude aircraft were red. 
 Intruder 2 and higher altitude aircraft were blue. 
As in Configuration 1, Configuration 2 cards were built in Microsoft Excel®. However, since all coordinates and 
geometries were provided by ARC IT&E Operations (and there was only one fireline route), the cards were created 
manually. The geo-referenced top view images were again created in FV and also manually. The following is a 
breakdown and description of unique elements on each of the Configuration 2 flight cards. Figures 39, 40, and 41 
depict the flight cards used for Configuration 2. 
a. Ownship – The ownship card depicted the aircraft route of flight as green. Below are the main cards sections, 
listed alphabetically, and a brief explanation for each: 
 Abort procedure: For Configuration 2, the word “abort” did not have the same meaning as in Configuration 1. 
Since the tracks for Configuration 2 were much longer (~40 minutes), an abort simply meant that the intruder 
aircraft would increase vertical separation (to obtain a separation of at least 500 ft between aircraft) and 
continue the encounter. If visual was not acquired within the 1-nmi range, the pilots would call “blind” and 
the TC would instruct them to hold level, climb, or descend, as required. 
 Aircraft role: This section specified whether the aircraft was the ownship, Intruder 1, or Intruder 2. 
 Aircraft: This section specified the call sign of the aircraft for that test card. 
 COMEX: Although there are several sections to input COMEX, the fireline route only had one COMEX at 
the beginning of the mission. This section was therefore used to show at what time an intruder would push 
to CPA instead. 
 Configuration: This section was the flight-test series configuration. Configuration 2 had one Full Mission. 
 Deconfliction altitude: Altitude aircraft would fly in between test points. A carry over from Configuration 1, 
ultimately participants stayed at their encounter altitude in between runs for efficiency.  
 Distance: This section was the distance between IP waypoint (WP) and encounter WP in nautical miles, for 
reference. 
 Fly-to WP: The Fly-to WP is the point the aircraft is expected to fly-to if there is no encounter. For a couple 
of encounters (3, and 4) the Fly-to WP is used since the live encounter WP is not on the flight plan for the 
ownship. 
 Holding pattern: This section shows the ownship holding pattern before COMEX and the start of the fireline 
route. 
 Live encounter number: This section denotes which live encounter on the fireline is being shown. The route 
had 4 live encounters (1, and 3 – intruder 1, and 2, and 4 – intruder 2). 
 Live encounter WP: This section was the WP at which the intruder is heading to, and the live encounter, will 
occur. 
 Live encounter: Live encounters occur with one ownship and one intruder (no multiship for Configuration 2). 
 Magnetic course: This section shows the expected MC at waypoint. 
 O/S encounter altitude: This section was the expected altitude of the ownship at the live encounter. 
 O/S encouter magnetic course: This section was the expected magnetic course of the ownship at the live 
encounter. 
 Ownship airspeed: This section shows the expected airspeed of the ownship at the live encounter. 
 Profile view: This section was the side view of the encounter showing expected altitudes and vertical 
separation for the ownship and intruder. 
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 TFR: A virtual TFR was added to the fireline route to keep all aircraft west of specific test areas (per a request 
from airspace coordination). 
 Top view: This section was the geo-referenced top view of the fireline route showing what the ideal case 
would look like. The top view shows both the live and virtual encounters, as well as the TFR and holding 
patterns. 
 VID notice: Since all live encounters were <500 ft for Configuration 2, a notice was displayed on the top 
view to warn participants that a VID was required by 1-nmi lateral separation or an abort would be called. 
 Virtual encounter: These encounters were only visible to the RGCS pilot. They were displayed to the aircraft 
pilots to show where a maneuver would be expected by the ownship from RGCS.  
 Waypoints: This section shows a list of waypoints for the aircraft to follow for the fireline. 
b. Intruder 1– The intruder 1 card depicted the aircraft route of flight as red. Below are the main cards sections 
and a brief explanation for each: 
 Waypoint IP: This section denotes the waypoint the intruder aircraft was expected to push out from. This 
waypoint was denoted as a square symbol and labeled so that the intruder could have quick SA on where to 
push from. 
 Holding pattern 1: Intruder 1 had two separate holding patterns. This one was before encounter 1 and located 
in the southwest. 
 Holding pattern 2: This holding pattern was before encounter 3 on the fireline (the intruder 1 second 
encounter) and located in the northeast. 
c. Intruder 2 – The intruder 2 card depicted the aircraft route of flight as blue. Below are the main cards sections 
and a brief explanation for each: 
 Holding pattern 1: This holding pattern was before encounter 2 on the fireline (the intruder 2 first encounter) 
and located in the southeast. 
 Holding pattern 2: This holding pattern was before encounter 4 on the fireline (the intruder 2 second 
encounter) and located in the north. 
V. Flight Summary and Data 
 This section describes the results observed by the operations team in both configurations of the flight test. The 
results were tabulated and distributed to the test team. 
A. Configuration 1 
Configuration 1 flight points were conducted from June 17, 2015, to July 24, 2015. Flight cards (divided into 
sections by day) that were flown for Configuration 1 are shown in Appendices A–K. 
Scenarios were prioritized in the following ways: 
 Priority based on researcher input (Priority 1, 2, 3, and 4) 
 Build up approach (higher to lower vertical separation, advisory to auto, and less to greater complexity) 
 Ease of flight (airspace transition from one encounter to next) 
 Repeating geometries grouped 
 Sun angle consideration 
Figure 42 shows an overview of all planned scenarios for Configuration 1. Test points not completed are grayed 
out. Test points that are crossed out were removed from the flight schedule by the researcher (deemed unnecessary for 
mission success). 
An altimeter calibration was performed for flights with a vertical separation of less than 500 ft. This calibration 
was performed in order to ensure that the scenario would achieve the correct alerting for the researchers’ algorithms 
and TCAS SUT. 
The subjective analysis is according to AFRC Ops and may differ from researchers’ opinions. Test points are 
shown in order flown. Flight duration is based on the time in the air of the ownship. COMEX is written in local time. 
Traffic advisories (TAs) and RAs are noted. Altitudes are flight level MSL and at CPA or maneuver start. Sensors 
selected for that encounter are shown (ADS-B, radar, TCAS, Tracker). The last three columns are timing from CPA 
(+ is to arrive after, - is to arrive before) or maneuver suggested by display (if type is “Follow”). Boxes with a “-” 
denote missing data. [R] is repeat. Tables 11–21 show Configuration 1 flight data. 
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1. Flight 1: June 17, 2015 
 
Table 11. Configuration 1, flight 1 data. 
 
 
 
Notes: Altimeter calibration was performed (the N3GC aircraft +50 ft). Level acceleration was performed. 
Artificial offset was applied for 1,000-ft runs. 300 ft non-head-on encounters were not allowed due to no ADS-B in 
SAF. This flight used wind matrix for climb/descent encounters. 
Encounters:  
 1 – good 
 2 – good 
 3 – O/S RA, good 
 4 – INT1 start off angle ~30 degrees MC, good 
 5 – good 
 6 – good 
 7 – run 3 minutes instead of 3.25 minutes, INT1 turn late, bad 
 8 – good 
 9 – wind adjust -10 seconds, TA to climb rather than descend (O/S), good 
 10 – wind adjust +7 seconds, INT1 late, bad 
 11 – wind adjust -12 seconds, good 
 12 – ABORT lost VID 
 13 – good 
 14 – O/S late, bad 
 15 – good 
Airspace: Requested Buckhorn, SPORT raised flight test to flight level (FL)140 then FL150 (temporary) due to 
MQ-9 lasing in West Range; affected runs 7, and 8.  
Barometer/Visibility: 29.92 in/Hg, clear 
Wind: 1 – O/S 251/20, INT1 220/10, 8 – O/S 205/18, INT1 195/20, 10 – INT1 256/10, 11 – INT1 210/17 
Bottom line: Overall, test points were conducted well. The wind matrix had some errors and went through its first 
iteration. Although ADS-B was not functional in the SAF, the test was still able to continue for 300-ft “head-on” (0 
degrees angle into) encounters. Additionally, Fusion (Tracker) was seeing problems with tracks. Nonetheless, the 
researcher was pleased with data since there was no “real world” data previous to this flight. A decision was made to 
audibly announce TA/RA alerts for proceeding flights (all platforms). 
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2. Flight 2: June 18, 2015 
 
Table 12. Configuration 1, flight 2 data. 
 
 
  
Notes: Altimeter calibration was performed (the N3GC aircraft +60 ft). Artificial offset was applied for 1,000-ft 
runs. This flight used wind matrix climb/descent encounters. O/S collected additional ADS-B data after run 23. 
Encounters:  
 1 – O/S RA good 
 2 – O/S RA descend, INT1 RA climb, good 
 3 – wind adjust +13 seconds, INT1 off course ~130 KIAS, good 
 4 – no wind adjust communication, relax vertical speed indicator (VSI), bad 
 5 – raised INT1 start altitude FL130, wind adjust -20 seconds, relax VSI, good 
 6 – wind adjust +15 seconds, good 
 7 – wind adjust +8 seconds, wind died to 16 kn by end, set 1,100 VSI for Ikhana = 1,000 VSI, good 
 8 – wind adjust -19 seconds, good 
 9 – wind adjust +20 seconds, O/S sped up KIAS, good 
 10 – wind adjust +5 seconds, O/S sped up KIAS, good 
 11 – wind adjust -10 seconds, sped up KIAS, good 
 12 – no wind adjust, good 
 13 – wind adjust +12 seconds, good 
 14 – wind adjust -26 seconds, climb too early (should have reset), bad 
 15 – wind adjust +20 seconds, good 
 16 – wind adjust +8 seconds, good 
 17 – decision: no wind adjust, O/S early/INT1 late (whole run), bad 
 18 – wind adjust +12 seconds, late start descent with overshoot, bad 
 19 – wind adjust +5 seconds, good 
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 20 – wind adjust +18 seconds (opposite of wind matrix), good 
 21 – reset, INT1 too slow to make CPA 
 22 – good 
 23 – good 
Airspace: No Buckhorn below FL130 and above FL200 (temporary); did not affect runs. 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.92 in/Hg, clear 
Wind: 1 – O/S 274/23, INT1 274/27, 3 – O/S 282/15, INT1 296/17, 4 – INT1 289/20, 5 – INT1 265/18, 6 – O/S 
282/15, 7 – O/S 285/25, 8 – O/S 270/15, 9 – O/S 285/20, 10 – O/S 290/19, 11 – O/S 300/10, 12 – INT1 252/21, 13 – 
O/S 270/20, INT1 252/16, 14 – INT1 281/23, 15 – O/S 280/22, 16 – O/S 285/22, 17 – O/S 260/11, 18 – INT1 264/13, 
19 – INT1 288/21, 20 – INT1 256/16 
Bottom line: Overall, test points were conducted well. Additional errors were present in the wind matrix that were 
corrected after this flight. The team was getting into a flow that helped with obtaining more test runs for this day. 
3. Flight 3: June 22, 2015 
 
Table 13. Configuration 1, flight 3 data. 
 
 
 
Notes: Altimeter calibration was performed (the N3GC aircraft +60 ft). Artificial offset was applied for 1,000-ft 
runs. This flight used wind matrix climb/descent encounters. All runs were ADS-B only (due to poor Fusion 
performance). 
Encounters: 
 1 – INT1 ground speed 10-15 low, good 
 2 – seems excessive turn, bad 
 3 – good 
 4 – wind adjust +5 seconds, good 
 5 – wind adjust +5 seconds, good 
 6 – wind adjust -5 seconds, good 
 7 – wind adjust -25 seconds, good 
 8 – 29.97 (ground), wind adjust -20 seconds, good 
 9 – wind adjust +5 seconds, O/S slow and late, bad 
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 10 – wind adjust +10 seconds, good 
 11 – wind adjust +10 seconds, good 
 12 – wind adjust -20 seconds, INT1 request reset, good 
 13 – wind adjust -5 seconds, maneuver and level off, good 
 14 – wind adjust -5 seconds, maneuver and level off, good 
 15 – wind adjust +5 seconds, maneuver and level off, O/S request reset (too fast), bad 
 16 – CBDR, merged, bad 
 17 – O/S request reset, good 
 18 – CBDR, merged, bad 
 19 – wind adjust 0 seconds, INT1 request reset, good 
 20 – wind adjust +10 seconds, INT1 request reset, good 
Airspace: R-2515 FL200 and below, Buckhorn FL100 and above, R-2515 SPORT stay FL120 and above; did not 
affect runs. 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.95 in/Hg, clear 
Wind: 3 – INT1 221/19, 4 – INT1 209/7, 5 – INT1 207/5, 6 – INT1 294/8, 7 – O/S 257/18, INT1 204/13, 8 – O/S 
237/15, INT1 160/3, 9 – O/S 217/8, INT1 217/10, 10 – O/S 203/6, INT1 194/22, 11 – O/S 224/10, INT1 232/13, 12 – 
O/S 167/6, INT1 225/20, 13 – O/S 220/8, INT1 223/21, 14 – O/S 217/8, INT1 256/12, 15 – O/S 195/7, INT1 232/18, 
19 – O/S 237/18, INT1 180/10, 20 – O/S 244/15, INT1 232/14 
Bottom Line: Overall, test points were conducted well, but maneuvers were only of acceptable quality. Display of 
VSCS (seen in SAF) was showing identical directive maneuvers for different encounters. The directive guidance was 
thought odd as each encounter was of a new geometry. Wind matrix worked well for this flight day. This flight was 
the first case where it seemed CPA timing was not as important as intent for maneuvering encounters; algorithm only 
needed to be alerted, followed by O/S maneuver. 
4. Flight 4: June 24, 2015 
 
Table 14. Configuration 1, flight 4 data. 
 
  
 
Notes: Altimeter calibration was performed (the N3GC aircraft +80 ft). 
  
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type COMEX O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA ADS-B RDR TCAS TRC O/S Int1 Int2
1 137-L53C TCAS Advisory 0640 145 137 TA N/A N/A X X X -2 +5 N/A
2 137-L53C [R] TCAS Advisory 0650 145 TA/RA 140 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X -5 -6 N/A
3 137-L53C TCAS AUTO 0702 145 TA/RA 140 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X +25 0 N/A
4 146-L54D TCAS Advisory 0720 120 TA 130 TA N/A N/A X X X -12 -8 N/A
5 146-L54D [R] TCAS Advisory 0730 120 TA/RA 125 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X 0 +5 N/A
6 146-L54D TCAS AUTO 0741 120 TA/RA 125 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X 0 0 N/A
7 140-L55A TCAS Advisory 0753 135 145 N/A N/A X X X +5 +3 N/A
8 140-L55A [R] TCAS Advisory 0804 140 TA/RA 145 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X +13 +5 N/A
9 140-L55A TCAS AUTO 0813 140 TA/RA 145 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X -2 +3 N/A
10 151-L56F TCAS Advisory 0823 125 TA/RA 120 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X -7 -2 N/A
11 151-L56F TCAS AUTO 0833 125 TA/RA 120 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X - 0 N/A
12 115-L32G Radar CBDR (110) 0841 120 TA/RA 123 TA N/A N/A X -40 -30 N/A
13 121-L32G Radar CBDR (90) 0855 120 TA/RA 123 TA/RA N/A N/A X X - -30 N/A
14 115-L32G [R] Radar CBDR (110) 0909 120 TA/RA 124 TA/RA N/A N/A X X -30 -60 N/A
15 117-L53G Radar CBDR (110) 0923 165 TA/RA 160 TA/RA N/A N/A X X -30 -30 N/A
16 124-L55G Radar CBDR (90) 0936 170 TA/RA 175 TA/RA N/A N/A X X -30 -40 N/A
17 128-L32A TCAS Advisory 0955 120 TA/RA 123 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X +7 -1 N/A
18 128-L32A TCAS AUTO 1005 120 TA/RA 123 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X +6 +5 N/A
19 129-L32C TCAS Advisory 1015 120 TA/RA 123 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X -7 -4 N/A
20 129-L32C TCAS AUTO 1025 120 TA/RA 123 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X -3 -7 N/A
Data
4
CPDS
4.7 hours
N3GC
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Encounters:  
 1 – no RA, bad 
 2 – raised INT1 start altitude FL115, O/S RA climb, good 
 3 – raised INT1 start altitude FL115, O/S RA climb, good 
 4 – multiple rolex, no RA, bad 
 5 – lowered INT1 start altitude FL150, O/S RA descend, good 
 6 – lowered INT1 start altitude FL150, O/S RA descend, good 
 7 – no RA, bad 
 8 – raised O/S start altitude FL115, O/S RA descend, good 
 9 – raised O/S start altitude FL115, O/S RA do not climb, good 
 10 – O/S RA do not descend, good 
 11 – O/S RA do not descend, good 
 12 – O/S RA do not climb, INT1 fast, bad 
 13 – O/S RA descend, INT1 slow, bad 
 14 – angle ~106°, good 
 15 – raised INT1 start altitude FL120, INT1 descend 1100 fpm, good 
 16 – raised O/S altitude FL120, O/S RA do not climb, good 
 17 – O/S RA do not climb, good 
 18 – O/S RA descend, good 
 19 – O/S RA descend, did not descend, bad 
 20 – O/S RA descend, good 
Airspace: Buckhorn active FL200 and below, later cleared FL120-200; did not affect runs. 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.91 in/Hg, clear 
Wind: 1 – O/S 167/17, INT1 160/16, 2 – O/S 152/17, INT1 141/20, 3 – O/S 168/9, INT1 156/19, 4 – O/S 147/13, 
INT1 195/8, 5 – O/S 134/13, INT1 231/6, 6 – O/S 134/13, INT1 278/7, 7 – O/S 184/12, INT1 188/12, 8 – O/S 185/10, 
INT1 192/10, 9 – O/S 190/10, INT1 calm, 10 – O/S 200/10, INT1 240/19, 11 – O/S 280/6, INT1 calm, 13 – O/S 
188/12, INT1 188/17, 14 – O/S 192/12, INT1 178/18, 15 – O/S 222/13, 219/15, 16 – O/S 169/16, INT1 188/11, 17 – 
O/S 205/16, INT1 155/13, 18 – O/S 208/17, INT1 calm, 19 – O/S 205/15, INT1 161/11, 20 – O/S 209/15, INT1 176/21 
Bottom Line: Some starting altitudes needed to be raised or lowered (500 ft) real time in order for aircraft to 
achieve desired performance and trigger RAs. Once the altitudes were adjusted, the TCAS system was successfully 
tested and Ikhana performed maneuvers that were expected for the particular encounter and in the milestone AUTO 
mode. For radar CBDR encounters, the N3GC aircraft attempted to use a bearing tool on board the aircraft; although 
the tool itself was effective, the encounter angle itself was not completely understood by the crew. Thus, the relative 
angle of several of the radar encounters was incorrect. For the encounters where the angle was correct, the radar data 
were deemed good by the researcher. Altitude redlines were made to proceeding flights cards to meet aircraft 
performance based on the outcome of this flight. CBDR cards were modified for proceeding flights to better highlight 
how to perform this type of encounter. 
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5. Flight 5: June 26, 2015 
 
Table 15. Configuration 1, flight 5 data. 
  
 
 
Notes: Altimeter calibration was performed (the N3GC aircraft +60 ft, the NASA 865 aircrarft +190 ft). Additional 
200-ft encounters were planned, but not performed (TCAS sequential); alerting achieved with 300-ft separation 
(runs 8, 9). 
Encounters:  
 1 – good 
 2 – good 
 3 – good 
 4 – good 
 5 – O/S was not supposed to maneuver (+not called out), INT1 RA climb, good 
 6 – INT1 heading wrong on maneuver, good 
 7 – good 
 8 – O/S RA climb, about 20 seconds then O/S RA descend, NO VID INT2 on O/S, good 
 9 – O/S RA descend, about 8 seconds then O/S RA climb, good 
 10 – good 
 11 – good 
 12 – good 
 13 – RA INT1 monitor vertical speed, good 
 14 – INT1 RA adjust vertical speed, good 
 15 – O/S RA climb, INT1 RA adjust vertical speed, good 
 16 – O/S RA climb, INT1 RA descend, good 
 Airspace: Received Buckhorn early FL100-200. 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.99 in/Hg, hazy (due to Lake wildfire) 
Wind: 12 – O/S 160/13, INT1 158/19, 14 – O/S 169/14, INT1 150/11 
Bottom Line: Considering the challenging geometries and conditions (weather), this flight collection day was 
excellent. The first multiship live UAS encounter in flight-test history was performed (runs 5, 6, and 7). First low 
altitude radar runs were performed to test DRR on Ikhana (runs 1, 2, 3, and 4). The TCAS multiship sequential 
encounters (runs 8, and 9) ran smoothly and safely, all triggering expected alerting in advisory mode. Although a 
mission rule was violated (run 8, no VID), at no point did the pilots or any other team member feel unsafe or that the 
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type COMEX O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA ADS-B RDR TCAS TRC O/S Int1 Int2
1 108-L12A Radar low  alt. 0637 052 062 N/A N/A X -2 +2 N/A
2 107-L12A Radar low  alt. 0647 042 052 N/A N/A X X -8 +1 N/A
3 112-L11A Radar low  alt. 0657 062 052 N/A N/A X X 0 +2 N/A
4 111-L11A Radar low  alt. 0708 052 042 N/A N/A X X +9 0 N/A
5 169-M79X Fly-through, CPDS 0822 130 TA/RA 134 TA/RA 125 X X RT +10 +5
6 170-M79X Fly-through, CPDS 0834 130 134 125 X X - - -
7 171-M79X Fly-through, CPDS 0846 130 TA 134 TA 125 X X +2 0 -4
8 160-M67Q TCAS Advisory 0858 133 TA/RA 14 TA/RA 13 TA X X X - - -
9 161-M68Q TCAS Advisory 0909 137 TA/RA 14 TA/RA 13 TA X X X 0 - +8
10 165-L52M Fly-through, CPDS 0924 120 TA 125 TA N/A N/A X X +10 +15 N/A
11 166-L52M Fly-through, CPDS 0937 120 TA 125 TA N/A N/A X X +10 0 N/A
12 167-L52M Fly-through, CPDS 0947 120 TA 125 TA N/A N/A X X -9 0 N/A
13 168-L52M Follow  CPDS 0957 120 TA/RA 125 TA/RA N/A N/A X X RT -3 N/A
14 164-L42M Follow  CPDS 1007 120 TA/RA 125 RA N/A N/A X X LT 0 N/A
15 132-L31A TCAS Advisory 1018 123 120 N/A N/A X X X - - N/A
16 132-L31A TCAS AUTO 1028 123 120 N/A N/A X X X 0 +5 N/A
Data
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flight could not continue. Additional, directive guidance was given to pilots concerning VID after run 8 and in 
proceeding flights. 
 
6. Flight 6: July 7, 2015 
 
Table 16. Configuration 1, flight 6 data. 
  
 
 
Notes: Altimeter calibration was performed (the N3GC aircraft +60 ft). What looked like a level acceleration was 
performed (should not have been). All climb/descent leg altitudes were redlined prior to flight to achieve “run-in” type 
encounters for Stratway+. 
Encounters:  
 1 – good 
 2 – odd run (O/S maneuver into INT1), good 
 3 – good 
 4 – VSCS split track, band issues (almost terminate run), bad 
 5 – vertical velocity noise in Stratway+, good 
 6 – good 
 7 – split track, good 
 8 – INT1 RA descend, good 
 9 – maintained heading, O/S RA do not descend, INT1 RA descend, bad 
 10 – split track, good 
 11 – maintained heading, O/S fast, bad 
 12 – TC push INT1 faster (210 KGS), terminate early due to north airspace activity, good 
 13 – O/S RA descend, INT1 RA climb, good 
 14 – O/S RA descend, INT1 RA climb, good 
 15 – O/S RA do not climb, INT1 RA monitor vertical speed, good 
 16 – good 
 17 – changed Stratway+ sensitivity, laptop problem and multiple rolex, good 
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type COMEX O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA ADS-B RDR TCAS TRC O/S Int1 Int2
1 25-L53C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0645 145 TA 130 TA N/A N/A X RT 0 N/A
2 46-L53D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0655 145 TA/RA 135 TA/RA N/A N/A X X RT 0 N/A
3 68-L53F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0707 145 120 N/A N/A X X LT 0 N/A
4 26-L54C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0717 120 TA 145 TA N/A N/A X X RT 0 N/A
5 47-L54D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0727 120 TA 135 TA N/A N/A X X RT +3 N/A
6 69-L54F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0736 120 137 N/A N/A X X LT +7 N/A
7 5-L56A Follow  Stratw ay+ 0746 142 TA 125 TA N/A N/A X X RT -2 N/A
8 6-L56B Follow  Stratw ay+ 0756 141 TA/RA 125 TA/RA N/A N/A X X LT 0 N/A
9 23-L56C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0808 - TA/RA 125 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X None -10 N/A
10 44-L56D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0817 150 TA 125 TA N/A N/A X X X RT +3 N/A
11 66-L56F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0825 130 125 N/A N/A X None +7 N/A
12 66-L56F [R] Follow  Stratw ay+ 0842 140 125 N/A N/A X LT early N/A
13 1-L42A Follow  Stratw ay+ 0852 120 TA/RA 124 TA/RA N/A N/A X RT 0 N/A
14 2-L42B Follow  Stratw ay+ 0902 120 TA/RA 124 RA N/A N/A X X X X LT -13 N/A
15 21-L42C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0912 120 TA/RA 124 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X X LT 0 N/A
16 42-L42D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0922 120 TA 124 TA N/A N/A X X X X LT 0 N/A
17 64-L42F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0940 120 124 N/A N/A X X X X LT 0 N/A
18 20-L32A Follow  Stratw ay+ 0950 120 TA 124 TA N/A N/A X X X X RT +2 N/A
19 31-L32C Follow  Stratw ay+ 1005 130 TA/RA 133 TA/RA N/A N/A X LT +2 N/A
20 51-L32D Follow  Stratw ay+ 1015 130 TA 133 TA N/A N/A X LT 0 N/A
21 68-L53F Follow  Stratw ay+ 1027 145 125 N/A N/A X X LT -1 N/A
22 69-L54F Follow  Stratw ay+ 1037 120 145 N/A N/A X X X LT early N/A
6
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 18 – INT1 ended at higher altitude (+100 ft), good 
 19 – good 
 20 – good 
 21 – good 
 22 – good 
Airspace: Multiple calls to SPORT were unanswered. Stay above FL105 (did not affect runs). SPORT called 
combat laser, request stay above FL130 (affected runs 19, and 20). Later stay above FL100 (did not affect runs). 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.97in/Hg, clear 
Wind: 4 – O/S 170/25, INT1 180/19, 7 – O/S 189/7, INT1 175/18, 10 – O/S 193/6.5, INT1 207/24, 13 – O/S 
160/17, INT1 176/20, 18 – O/S 178/13, INT1 169/20, 19 – O/S 191/19, INT1 134/19, 21 – O/S 176/10, INT1 191/13 
Bottom Line: The bulk of the data were good, but the “split tracks” that kept occurring on VSCS were thought too 
distracting/incorrect for subsequent days. Thus, in proceeding flights the native Stratway+ display was used in the 
Ikhana GCS instead of the algorithm being fed through VSCS. 
7. Flight 7: July 9, 2015 
 
Table 17. Configuration 1, flight 7 data. 
 
 
   
Notes: Altimeter calibration was performed (the N3GC aircraft +60 ft). All climb/descent leg altitudes were 
redlined prior to flight to achieve “merge intent” type encounters for Stratway+. This flight used native Stratway+ 
display in Ikhana GCS. 
Encounters:  
 1 – O/S RA descend, INT1 RA climb, TC slowed INT1 10 kn, good 
 2 – O/S large deviation from CPA, good 
 3 – TC slowed INT1 10 kn, good 
 4 – performed maneuver but did not turn back, bad 
 5 – good 
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type COMEX O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA ADS-B RDR TCAS TRC O/S Int1 Int2
1 22-L55C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0653 132 TA/RA 145 TA/RA N/A N/A X R275 - N/A
2 43-L55D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0703 125 145 N/A N/A X R050 +2 N/A
3 65-L55F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0713 127 145 N/A N/A X L060 +20 N/A
4 24-L57C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0725 122 TA 167 TA N/A N/A X R265 0 N/A
5 45-L57D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0735 118 TA 162 TA N/A N/A X L330 +5 N/A
6 67-L57F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0743 119 16 N/A N/A X L060 +10 N/A
7 7-L57A Follow  Stratw ay+ 0755 120 TA 158 TA N/A N/A X X X R270 - N/A
8 3-L55A Follow  Stratw ay+ 0807 131 145 N/A N/A X X X L200 0 N/A
9 4-L55B Follow  Stratw ay+ 0819 120 TA 145 TA N/A N/A X X L225 +1 N/A
10 21-L42C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0830 120 TA/RA 124 TA/RA N/A N/A X X X X R260 0 N/A
11 42-L42D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0840 120 TA 124 TA N/A N/A X X X X L330 +5 N/A
12 64-L42F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0848 120 TA 124 TA N/A N/A X X X X R130 0 N/A
13 26-L54C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0900 120 132 N/A N/A X X X X R285 0 N/A
14 47-L54D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0909 120 TA/RA 126 TA/RA N/A N/A X L230 - N/A
15 47-L54D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0920 120 TA 140 TA N/A N/A X X X X R030 +4 N/A
16 22-L55C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0930 131 TA 145 TA N/A N/A X X X X R270 0 N/A
17 43-L55D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0940 127 145 N/A N/A X X X X R060 0 N/A
18 65-L55F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0948 - 145 N/A N/A X L050 early N/A
19 24-L57C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0958 124 TA 168 TA N/A N/A X X X X R270 0 N/A
20 45-L57D Follow  Stratw ay+ 1007 - TA/RA - TA N/A N/A X X X X R055 +5 N/A
21 67-L57F Follow  Stratw ay+ 1016 140 TA 145 TA N/A N/A X None - N/A
22 25-L53C Follow  Stratw ay+ 1026 145 TA 130 TA N/A N/A X R270 -9 N/A
23 46-L53D Follow  Stratw ay+ 1036 145 TA/RA 125 TA N/A N/A X R045 0 N/A
N3GC
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 6 – TC slowed INT1 10 kn, resumed speed at turn, good 
 7 – good 
 8 – good 
 9 – good 
 10 – O/S RA do not climb, INT1 RA monitor speed 
 11 – good 
 12 – good 
 13 – good 
 14 – O/S RA do not climb, INT1 RA maintain vertical speed, good 
 15 – late turn back on course, good 
 16 – good 
 17 – good 
 18 – terminate early due to no airspace north, good 
 19 – good 
 20 – 200-ft excursion, O/S RA descend, good 
 21 – no banding, bad 
 22 – good 
 23 – O/S RA climb, good 
Airspace: SPORT stay FL105-200 (did not affect runs), C-17 FL060 and below (did not affect runs). FT3 multiple 
spillouts north of airspace (coordinated minutes prior with SPORT). 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.81 in/Hg, haze layer, good visibility at altitude 
Wind: 1 – O/S 220/15.5, INT1 235/12, 4 – O/S 191/17, INT1 228/24, 7 – O/S 193/16, INT1 233/26, 8 – O/S 
206/15, INT1 238/17, 11 – O/S 174/11, INT1 209/9, 13 – O/S 180/19, INT1 250/16, 15 – O/S 200/12, INT1 234/16, 
16 – O/S 205/15, INT1 195/16, 18 – O/S 190/11, INT1 218/7, 19 – O/S 200/14, INT1 237/19, 22 – O/S 220/20, INT1 
180/21 
Bottom Line: Overall, encounters were good and using the native Stratway+ display helped the O/S pilots better 
understand the banding which they needed to fly. Intruder aircraft had timing issues this day (caused several rolex 
calls), but did not affect runs. 
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8. Flight 8: July 10, 2015 
 
Table 18. Configuration 1, flight 8 data. 
 
 
 
Notes: Altimeter calibration was performed (the N3GC aircraft +60 ft, NASA 865 aircraft +100 ft). All 
climb/descent leg altitudes were redlined prior to flight to achieve merge intent type encounters for Stratway+. This 
flight used native Stratway+ display in Ikhana GCS. TCAS on the NASA 865 aircraft showed Ikhana 300 ft high; runs 
18, 19, and 20 radar runs with CPDS display. 
Encounters:  
 1 – good 
 2 – good 
 3 – good 
 4 – good 
 5 – good 
 6 – good 
 7 – good, INT2 late TA from INT1 
 8 – INT1 RA monitor vertical speed, good 
 9 – good, INT2 late TA from INT1 
 10 – O/S RA maintain level, INT1 monitor/adjust vertical speed, INT2 TA from INT1, good 
 11 – O/S RA do not descend, INT2 TA from INT1 
 12 – good 
 13 – good, INT2 TA from INT1 
 14 – good, INT2 TA from INT1 
 15 – good 
 16 – good 
 17 – good 
 18 – INT1 RA descend, INT1 (fast) ahead of O/S, bad 
 19 – angle about 80° instead of 90°, O/S RA climb, INT1 RA descend, good 
 20 – angle 95° most of run and 110° at the end, O/S RA descend, INT1 RA monitor vertical speed, good 
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type COMEX O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA ADS-B RDR TCAS TRC O/S Int1 Int2
1 8-M59Q Follow  Stratw ay+ 0646 130 TA 135 TA 125 X L330 +1 +3
2 8-M59Q Follow  Stratw ay+ 0656 130 TA 135 TA 125 X X X X L040 +2 +4
3 28-M59V Follow  Stratw ay+ 0705 130 TA 135 TA 125 TA X R290 0 +8
4 28-M59V Follow  Stratw ay+ 0715 130 TA 135 TA 125 TA X X X X R290 +5 +4
5 71-M59W Follow  Stratw ay+ 0725 130 TA 135 TA 125 TA X L370 +4 +11
6 71-M59W Follow  Stratw ay+ 0735 130 TA 135 125 TA X X X X L300 +3 +5
7 9-M59U Follow  Stratw ay+ 0745 130 135 125 TA X R370 +1 0
8 27-M59R Follow  Stratw ay+ 0755 130 TA/RA 135 TA/RA 125 X R310 +6 0
9 48-M59S Follow  Stratw ay+ 0805 130 TA 135 TA 125 TA X R330 +1 0
10 70-M59T Follow  Stratw ay+ 0815 130 TA/RA 135 TA/RA 125 TA X L270 +10 0
11 9-M59U Follow  Stratw ay+ 0827 130 TA/RA 135 125 TA X X X X R300 0 +5
12 27-M59R Follow  Stratw ay+ 0854 130 TA 135 TA 125 X X X X R270 +1 -4
13 48-M59S Follow  Stratw ay+ 0905 130 TA 135 TA 125 TA X X X X R285 +2 0
14 70-M59T Follow  Stratw ay+ 0915 130 TA 135 TA 125 TA X X X X R303 +4 +5
15 63-L12N Follow  Stratw ay+ 0927 120 130 N/A N/A X R330 -20 N/A
16 63-L12N Follow  Stratw ay+ 0935 120 130 N/A N/A X X X X R302 -15 N/A
17 63-L12N Follow  Stratw ay+ 0943 120 130 N/A N/A X R300 -15 N/A
18 122-L31G Radar CBDR (90) 0953 120 TA/RA 123 TA/RA N/A N/A X X -40 -50 N/A
19 122-L31G [R] Radar CBDR (90) 1010 120 TA/RA 123 TA/RA N/A N/A X X - - N/A
20 125-L54G Radar CBDR (90) 1022 110 TA/RA 115 TA/RA N/A N/A X X - - N/A
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Airspace: Stay below FL230 Buckhorn (did not affect runs). Spin aircraft FL110 and above 45 minutes (did not 
affect runs).  
Barometer/Visibility: 29.86 in/Hg, clear 
Wind: 1 – O/S 270/3, 9 – O/S 265/11, INT1 223/5, INT2 calm, 15 – O/S 145/10, INT1 194/15 
Bottom Line: Overall data were good. Second day of multiship encounters went smoothly as the first. Adjusting 
the vertical profile caused a lot more alerting for Stratway+ (good). Runs 18, 19, and 20 gathered good radar data due 
to change in altitude and better understanding of angle requirements from pilots. 
9. Flight 9: July 21, 2015 
 
Table 19. Configuration 1, flight 9 data. 
 
 
 
Notes: Altimeter calibration was performed (The NASA 850 aircraft +140 ft, the NASA 865 aircraft +100 ft). All 
climb/descent leg altitudes were redlined prior to flight to achieve merge intent type encounters for Stratway+. Used 
native Stratway+ display in Ikhana GCS; runs 1-12 INT1 (NASA 850 aircraft), runs 9-17 INT1 (NASA 865 aircraft), 
runs18-20 INT1 (NASA 850 aircraft), INT2 (NASA 865 aircraft). 
Encounters:  
 1 – good 
 2 – good 
 3 – good 
 4 – O/S RA do not climb, good 
 5 – slow to develop and INT1 lagging, bad 
 6 – good 
 7 – became tail chase run, good 
 8 – good 
 9 – TC increase INT1 10 kn, INT1 started FL120 instead of 125, good 
 10 – O/S fast, INT1 started FL123 instead of 125, bad 
 11 – INT1 off course on IP, bad 
 12 – O/S RA do not climb, good 
 13 – good 
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type COMEX O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA ADS-B RDR TCAS TRC O/S Int1 Int2
1 72-H42A Follow  Stratw ay+ 0705 120 TA 124 N/A N/A X X X L055 +20 N/A
2 72-H42A Follow  Stratw ay+ 0715 120 TA/RA 124 N/A N/A X X L045 - N/A
3 73-H42C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0723 120 TA/RA 124 TA N/A N/A X X X R270 +25 N/A
4 73-H42C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0733 120 TA/RA 124 N/A N/A X X L215 -6 N/A
5 74-H42D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0741 120 TA 124 N/A N/A X X X L330 - N/A
6 74-H42D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0751 120 TA 124 TA N/A N/A X X L320 - N/A
7 75-H42F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0800 120 124 N/A N/A X X X L045 -5 N/A
8 75-H42F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0808 120 TA/RA 124 N/A N/A X X L010 0 N/A
9 23-L56C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0835 145 TA/RA 125 N/A N/A X X X X R270 - N/A
10 44-L56D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0843 142 TA 125 TA N/A N/A X X X X L335 -10 N/A
11 66-L56F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0851 152 125 TA N/A N/A X X X X L060 - N/A
12 31-L32C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0901 120 TA/RA 123 TA N/A N/A X X X X L220 -5 N/A
13 51-L32D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0910 120 TA 123 TA N/A N/A X X X X R020 0 N/A
14 23-L56C Follow  Stratw ay+ 0926 145 125 TA N/A N/A X L200 -20 N/A
15 44-L56D Follow  Stratw ay+ 0935 152 125 TA N/A N/A X L330 +5 N/A
16 66-L56F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0944 145 TA/RA 125 TA N/A N/A X L045 - N/A
17 66-L56F Follow  Stratw ay+ 0955 152 125 TA N/A N/A X X L030 -20 N/A
18 76-M59R Follow  Stratw ay+ 1015 130 TA/RA 135 TA 125 TA X X X L220 - -
19 76-M59R Follow  Stratw ay+ 1025 130 TA 135 125 TA X X R295 - -
20 77-M59S Follow  Stratw ay+ 1035 130 TA 135 125 TA X X X R340 +10 0
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 14 – good 
 15 – INT1 fast TC request go card speed, good 
 16 – O/S RA do not descend, O/S fast, INT1 increased speed, good 
 17 – good 
 18 – good 
 19 – good 
 20 – good  
Airspace: Fly below FL200 (did not affect runs), received Buckhorn FL100-200. 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.97 in/Hg, clear 
Wind: 12 – O/S 212/5 
Bottom Line: Flight 9 was another successful flight day for Stratway+ and the first ever high-speed multiship 
encounters. As the previous multiship encounters, these encounters went surprisingly smoothly and gave good data 
for the researcher. Although INT1 was late/early to the CPA for many of the encounters, numerous of these runs were 
successful due to the intent of the intruder; Stratway+ displayed good alerting for the O/S pilot. 
10. Flight 10: July 22, 2015 
 
Table 20. Configuration 1, flight 10 data. 
 
 
 
Notes: There was no altimeter calibration (all runs >500 ft) for this flight. Artificial offset was applied for 1,000-ft 
runs. 
Encounters:  
 1 – good 
 2 – good 
 3 – good 
 4 – wind adjust 0 seconds, good 
 5 – wind adjust +20 seconds, good 
 6 – wind adjust -10 seconds, good 
 7 – wind adjust -10 seconds, O/S kept climbing after maneuver, good 
 8 – wind adjust -20 seconds, O/S kept climbing after maneuver, good 
 9 – wind adjust +20 seconds, good 
 10 – wind adjust -5 seconds, INT1 max performance on climb, good 
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type COMEX O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA ADS-B RDR TCAS TRC O/S Int1 Int2
1 41-L12M Follow  AR1 0635 120 130 TA N/A N/A X 280 -15 N/A
2 63-L12N Follow  AR1 0645 120 TA 130 TA N/A N/A X 280 -20 N/A
3 61-L12E Follow  AR1 0655 120 TA 130 TA N/A N/A X R010 +5 N/A
4 13-L14A Follow  AR1 0705 120 TA 144 TA N/A N/A X R280 -8 N/A
5 35-L14C Follow  AR1 0715 120 TA 147 TA N/A N/A X R280 -3 N/A
6 55-L14D Follow  AR1 0725 120 TA 147 TA N/A N/A X L320 - N/A
7 15-L15A Follow  AR1 0735 138 160 N/A N/A X L230 0 N/A
8 37-L15C Follow  AR1 0745 135 160 N/A N/A X R270 -25 N/A
9 57-L15D Follow  AR1 0755 132 160 N/A N/A X L330 +8 N/A
10 11-L13A Follow  AR1 0805 165 TA 140 TA N/A N/A X R270 0 N/A
11 33-L13C Follow  AR1 0815 165 138 N/A N/A X R280 +3 N/A
12 53-L13D Follow  AR1 0825 165 TA 140 TA N/A N/A X L330 +12 N/A
13 18-L12A Fly-through, AR1 0835 120 130 TA N/A N/A X X Some - N/A
14 29-L12C Fly-through, AR1 0845 120 130 TA N/A N/A X X None -4 N/A
15 49-L12D Fly-through, AR1 0855 120 130 TA N/A N/A X X -30 +9 N/A
16 18-L12A Fly-through, AR1 0905 120 130 N/A N/A X X X X +12 +10 N/A
17 29-L12C Fly-through, AR1 0915 120 130 TA N/A N/A X X X X +5 -4 N/A
NASA865
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 11 – wind adjust +20 seconds, good 
 12 – wind adjust -10 seconds, good 
 13 – intermittent headings, fly-through, bad 
 14 – no headings, fly-through, bad 
 15 – both aircraft too fast, O/S arrive early, INT1 corrected, bad 
 16 – O/S airspeed low at start of run, good 
 17 – good  
Airspace: Buckhorn received FL100-200, F-35 at FL220 (did not affect runs); later in day stay FL110-170 (did 
not affect runs). 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.86 in/Hg, clear 
Wind: 4 – O/S 215/15, INT1 168/38, 5 – O/S 220/14, INT1 180/26, 6 – O/S 175/13, INT1 187/30, 7 – O/S 210/15, 
INT1 180/20, 8 – O/S 210/20, INT1 180/25, 9 – O/S 170/15, INT1 230/24, 10 – O/S 210/20, INT1 160/30, 11 – INT1 
180/25, 12 – O/S 200/20, INT1 190/22 
Bottom Line: Overall it was a good, smooth day of data collection. This day had no aborts, rolex calls, or resets; a 
first for FT3. The wind matrix worked well for the climb/descent encounters. 
11. Flight 11: July 24, 2015 
 
Table 21. Configuration 1, flight 11 data. 
 
 
   
Notes: Altimeter calibration was performed (NASA 865 aircraft +100 ft).  
Encounters:  
 1 – virtual offset 500 ft, good 
 2 – O/S RA descend, good 
 3 – O/S RA do not climb, good 
 4 – O/S RA do not climb, good 
 5 – O/S RA do not climb, good 
 6 – O/S RA do not climb, good 
 7 – O/S RA descend (before run start), O/S RA descend, INT1 fly 190 kn per TC 
 8 – O/S RA do not climb, good 
 9 – O/S RA climb to FL130, good 
 10 – O/S RA climb FL130, INT1 on O/S camera, good 
 11 – O/S RA do not descend (before run start), O/S RA climb to FL130, good 
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type COMEX O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA ADS-B RDR TCAS TRC O/S Int1 Int2
1 168-L52M Follow  CPDS 0633 120 TA 125 TA N/A N/A X R275 -2 N/A
2 164-L42M Follow  CPDS 0643 120 TA/RA 124 TA N/A N/A X L250 +13 N/A
3 159-L57D TCAS Advisory 0652 140 TA/RA 145 TA N/A N/A X X X +7 +7 N/A
4 130-L32D TCAS Advisory 0702 120 TA/RA 123 TA N/A N/A X X X +10 +16 N/A
5 131-L32F TCAS Advisory 0710 120 TA/RA 123 TA N/A N/A X X X +7 -3 N/A
6 152-L32B TCAS Advisory 0720 120 TA/RA 123 TA N/A N/A X X X +10 +7 N/A
7 153-L32G TCAS Advisory 0730 120 TA/RA 123 TA N/A N/A X X X +2 +5 N/A
8 154-L32H TCAS Advisory 0738 120 TA/RA 123 TA N/A N/A X X X +15 +15 N/A
9 155-L31B TCAS Advisory 0747 123 TA/RA 120 TA N/A N/A X X X - - N/A
10 156-L31G TCAS Advisory 0756 123 TA/RA 120 TA N/A N/A X X X +5 +1 N/A
11 157-L31H TCAS Advisory 0805 123 TA/RA 120 N/A N/A X X X +5 +9 N/A
12 127-L12P Radar Zig Zag 0815 120 130 TA N/A N/A X X +3 +10 N/A
13 116-L31G Radar CBDR (110) 0824 123 RA 120 TA N/A N/A X X - - N/A
14 135-L31F TCAS Advisory 0832 123 TA/RA 120 TA N/A N/A X X X +8 +1 N/A
15 126-L56G Radar CBDR (90) 0842 115 TA/RA 110 TA N/A N/A X X -30 -32 N/A
16 120-L56G Radar CBDR (110) 0856 115 RA 110 N/A N/A X X -20 -30 N/A
3.2 hours
NASA865
Data
11
CPDS
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 12 – lagged slightly, good 
 13 – O/S RA climb, outside radar field of view, bad 
 14 – O/S RA climb, good 
 15 – O/S RA do not descend, good 
 16 – O/S RA do not descend, INT1 hold 200 kn per TC, good 
Airspace: Buckhorn received FL100-200.  
Barometer/Visibility: 29.92 in/Hg, slight haze 
Wind: Altitude calibration – O/S 230/25 
Bottom Line: An additional day of data collection of the CPDS and radar encounters was well received. Due to 
the previous practice of doing these types of encounters, the aircrews and ops team were well prepared, and the data 
collected was good. Although the Zig-Zag (run 12) encounter was expected to be an S-turn, the researchers were still 
pleased with the data received. The extra TCAS encounters also allowed all geometries shown on the “pinwheel” to 
be flown. This particular day also used the “wing flash” (run 13) technique to acquire VID, something that was 
considered for future testing. 
B. Configuration 2 
Configuration 2 flights were conducted from July 13, 2015, to August 12, 2015. Table 22 shows a summary of 
these flight days. A total of 12 preparation flights (Combined Systems Test (CST), Inertial Navigation System (INS), 
Rehearsal (REH) flights) and 3 data collection flights were performed. As mentioned, the Control and Non-Payload 
Communication (CNPC) and surrogate system was not ready for test and did not meet perceived requirements after 
these 3 runs. Thus, additional data runs were cancelled for Configuration 2 only. For the rehearsal runs, a truncated 
route was flown on some flight days. Data runs flew the entire route. Additionally, an altimeter calibration was not 
performed for Configuration 2 since the aircraft were simulating a normal flight environment. GRC flights are GRC 
only as the participant (NASA 608); CSTs, REHs, and data flights involved GRC, AFRC, and ARC using the LVC 
environment. Tables 23–37 show Configuration 2 flight data. 
 
Table 22. All flights for Configuration 2, including CSTs, rehearsals, data collection flights, and cancelled data 
collection flights. 
 
 
  
Flight Date
Day of 
Week
System Under 
Test
Encounter Types
Planned LIVE 
Encounters
Flown LIVE 
Encounters
LIVE Points 
Achieved
Virtual Points 
Flown
GRC 1 13-Jul-15 M CNPC (None) 0 0 0 0
CST 1 16-Jul-15 Th CNPC Targets of Opportunity 0 0 0 0
CST 2 28-Jul-15 Tu CNPC Live 4 2 0 0
GRC 2 29-Jul-15 W INS (None) 0 0 0 0
CST 3 29-Jul-15 W CNPC (None) 0 0 0 0
GRC 3 30-Jul-15 Th CNPC (None) 0 0 0 0
Rehearsal 1 3-Aug-15 M CNPC Live 8 4 0 0
GRC 4 4-Aug-15 Tu CNPC (None) 0 0 0 0
CST 4 4-Aug-15 Tu CNPC Live, Virtual 4 2 0 2
CST 5 5-Aug-15 W CNPC Live, Virtual 6 5 0 9
Rehearsal 2 6-Aug-15 Th CNPC (None) 8 0 0 0
Rehearsal 3 7-Aug-15 F CNPC Live 8 1 0 0
Data 1 10-Aug-15 M HSI/RGCS Live, Virtual 8 8 7 11
Data 2 11-Aug-15 Tu HSI/RGCS Live, Virtual 8 8 6 9
Data 3 12-Aug-15 W HSI/RGCS Live, Virtual 8 8 5 10
Data 4 13-Aug-15 Th HSI/RGCS
Data 5 17-Aug-15 M HSI/RGCS
Data 6 18-Aug-15 Tu HSI/RGCS
Data 7 19-Aug-15 W HSI/RGCS
Data 8 20-Aug-15 Th HSI/RGCS
Data 9 21-Aug-15 F HSI/RGCS
Data 10 24-Aug-15 M HSI/RGCS
Totals 62 38 18 41
CANCELLED
CANCELLED
CANCELLED
CANCELLED
CANCELLED
CANCELLED
CANCELLED
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1. Flight 1: July 13, 2015 
 
Table 23. Configuration 2, flight 1 data. 
 
 
 
Notes: RF Characterization Flight, the NASA 608 aircraft flew the fireline route once as planned to gather data on 
the CNPC RF radiation pattern. The fireline route was flown a second time with a 10-mile buffer to account for 
expected deviations during the Configuration 2 flight test. 
2. Flight 2: July 16, 2015 
 
Table 24. Configuration 2, flight 2 data. 
 
 
 
Notes: Flight 2 was an initial system checkout flight to verify command and control function with RGCS and 
establish valid data flow to the LVC environment from the ADS-B system using targets of opportunity. Issues were 
observed:  
 1) Up to 15-second delay from RGCS command to the NASA 608 response.  
2) ADS-B targets were incorrectly displayed on the VSCS and LVC systems. ADS-B traffic was stacked in 
columns. 
3. Flight 3: July 28, 2015 
 
Table 25. Configuration 2, flight 3 data. 
 
 
 
Notes: Flight to verify ADS-B issues were fixed. Issues observed:  
 1) Remote GRC team unavailable to start Vehicle Specific Module (VSM) scripts.  
 2) INS state information stale.  
 3) Research computer C2 script crashed multiple times.  
 4) ADS-B traffic data exhibits incorrect conversion to latitude/longitude.  
 5) Airspeed not shown on VSCS.  
 6) LVC Gateway crashed after 1 minute of initializing the GRC VSM script. 
Encounters: The NASA 865 aircraft practiced the first leg of the route for INT2 at FL144, while troubleshooting 
issues for the NASA 608 aircraft . COMEX 0820 performed encounter for WP 2 as INT1; performed encounter for 
WP 15 as INT1. 
Airspace: Some activity, moved the NASA 865 aircraft to INT1 holding and route. 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.92 in/Hg, hazy, but workable 
Wind: WP 2 encounter INT1 – 320/11 
Bottom Line: For the intruder, it was easier to skip through to waypoints and save time instead of following the 
pattern on the flight cards. Calls were being made in minutes and seconds to CPA, but it was mentioned by the pilots 
they preferred whole minutes, which was difficult to implement. From an operational perspective, all participants 
needed to be ready at flight time. For future flights, all participants arrived on time. 
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
GRC 1
CNPC
3.1 hours
None
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
CST 1
CNPC
1.3 hours
None
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
CST 2
CNPC
3.1 hours
NASA865
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4. Flight 4: July 29, 2015 
 
Table 26. Configuration 2, flight 4 data. 
  
 
 
Notes: GRC led flight test to troubleshoot INS issues observed during last flight. 
Encounters: None. 
5. Flight 5: July 29, 2015 
 
Table 27. Configuration 2, flight 5 data. 
   
 
 
Notes: RGCS/LVC systems connected for 30 minutes at the end of the flight. Issues observed:  
 1) LVC Gateway software crashed multiple times at around 1 minute after the GRC VSM traffic script was started.  
 2) ARC Multi Aircraft Control System (MACS) observer station never received O/S data. 
Encounters: None. 
6. Flight 6: July 30, 2015 
 
Table 28. Configuration 2, flight 6 data. 
  
 
  
Notes: GRC led flight test to troubleshoot LVC issues. The afternoon system checkout flight was cancelled due to 
weather. 
Encounters: None.  
  
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
2 hours
None
GRC 2
INS
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s) None
CST 3
CNPC
1.85 hours
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
GRC 3
CNPC
1.1 hours
None
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7. Flight 7: August 3, 2015 
 
Table 29. Configuration 2, flight 7 data. 
  
 
 
Notes: There were no virtual encounters, but some LVC gateway problems at the beginning of the flight day. The 
LVC required multiple system restarts. The NASA 608 aircraft originally could not go into navigation mode for any 
runs. 
Encounters:  
 1 – no lateral offset, bad  
 2 – no VID, bad  
 3 – good 
 4 – good 
Airspace: No data. 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.88 in/Hg, changed to 29.85 in/Hg at 1630 local time 
Wind: O/S 220/20, INT1 250/13, INT2 197/11 
Bottom Line: Although it was useful to practice the live encounters, to do a full rehearsal, virtual traffic would 
have been required as well. 
8. Flight 8: August 4, 2015 
 
Table 30. Configuration 2, flight 8 data. 
  
 
 
Notes: This flight had good O/S data and traffic from the VSM. Heading/altitude/speed changes looked good. 
Encounters: None. 
9. Flight 9: August 4, 2015 
 
Table 31. Configuration 2, flight 9 data. 
  
 
 
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type Push O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA
1 ENC1 Live 16:38:58 140 136 TA N/A N/A
2 ENC2 Live 16:45:36 140 N/A N/A 144 TA/RA
3 ENC3 Live 17:06:00 140 136 TA N/A N/A
4 ENC4 Live 17:07:30 140 N/A N/A 144 TA
Rehearsal 1
CNPC
3.3 hours
NASA7, N3GC
Result
-
16:46:15 Left turn, int2 RA climb 100ft
16:57:29 Left turn
17:10:40 Left turn
Data
Fireline 1 - COMEX 1637
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
CNPC
2.8 hours
None
GRC 4
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type Push O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA
1 ENC2 Live 17:13:45 140 N/A N/A 144 TA/RA
2 ENC4 Live 17:36:00 140 N/A N/A 144 TA
1 VE1 Virtual 140 (140) N/A N/A
Result
Fireline 1 - COMEX 1707
17:12:43 Left turn, int2 RA climb
17:31:59 Left turn
Fireline 2 - COMEX 1808
All virtual encounters
Data
2.9 hours
N3GC
CST 4
CNPC
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Notes: This flight had good live traffic, and bad virtual. Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) data were stale on 
multiple occasions. The NASA 608 aircraft was able to go into navigation mode. 
Encounters:  
1) Fireline 1 
 1 – good 
 2 – good 
2) Fireline 2: all virtual, only for testing scripts 
Airspace: Predator FL100-210, F-18 aircraft; did not affect runs. 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.89 in/Hg, ENC4 29.90, hazy 
Wind: INT2 237/27, Encounter (ENC) 4 INT2 226/30 
Bottom Line: Actual performance for the NASA 608 aircraft was approximately 500 fpm (as opposed to the 
required 1,000 fpm). On this flight day, it became absolutely clear there was a disconnect between the systems at 
AFRC and the systems at/near GRC. What should have been the second day of data collection was the 9th check 
flight. 
10. Flight 10: August 5, 2015 
 
Table 32. Configuration 2, flight 10 data. 
  
 
 
Notes: This flight had stale tracks on the LVC system. Even after reboot, the VSCS had stale data. The NASA 608 
aircraft was receiving commands from RGCS late or did not see them. The N3GC aircraft acted as INT1 for Fireline 
1, INT1 for Fireline 2, and both INT1/INT2 for Fireline 3. At the end of flight, the NASA 608 aircraft was asked to 
fly a cardinal direction (due west), but the direction did not look correct in any of the ground displays. 
Encounters:  
1) Fireline 1  
 1 – stale data, bad  
 2 – INT1 late, bad  
 3 – good 
 4 – good 
 5 – RGCS did not have control of the NASA 608 aircraft, bad  
2) Fireline 2 
 1 – good  
 2 – good  
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type Push O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA
1 VE1 Virtual 140 - N/A N/A
2 ENC1 Live 15:31:14 140 136 TA N/A N/A
3 ENC2 (virt) Virtual 140 (144) N/A N/A
4 ENC3 Live 15:42:05 140 136 TA N/A N/A
5 VE2 Virtual 140 - N/A N/A
1 VE1 Virtual 140 (145) N/A N/A
2 ENC1 Live 16:05:58 140 136 TA N/A N/A
3 ENC2 (virt) Virtual 148 (144) N/A N/A
4 VE2 Virtual 140 - N/A N/A
1 VE1 Virtual 140 (145) N/A N/A
2 ENC1 Live 16:40:02 141 136 TA N/A N/A
3 VE2 Virtual 138 (144) N/A N/A
4 VE3 Virtual 140 (144) N/A N/A
5 ENC4 Live 16:53:00 140 N/A N/A 154
N3GC
Result
Fireline 1 - COMEX 1528
Virtual intruder passed too early.
15:33:34 Left turn (due to WP or command?)
15:38:30 Right turn
15:39:18 Left turn, climb to 145 (later)
Fly-through WP7 to WP9
Fireline 2 - COMEX 1603
Fly-through WP1 to WP2
16:07:14 Right turn and climb
Descend 140, turn left
Fly-through
Fireline 3 - COMEX 1636
Fly-through
16:40:46 Expect climb
16:45:50 Left turn, climb to 140
Right turn
16:57:01 Right turn
Data
CST 5
CNPC
3 hours
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 3 – good  
 4 – good  
3) Fireline 3 
 1 – good  
 2 – good  
 3 – good  
 4 – good  
 5 – INT2 climbed to check vertical velocity 
Airspace: F-35 aircraft with tanker coming in to R-2515, may not use airspace for up to 2 hours (did not affect 
runs). 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.91 in/Hg, good 
Wind: INT1 227/29, Fireline 2 ENC 1 INT1 199/22, Fireline 3 ENC 1 INT1 225/24  
Bottom Line: Due to the fuel capacity of the O/S, 3 full runs would not be possible for any of the data runs as 
planned. Either the fireline had to be truncated (as was done this flight day) or less runs could be performed per day. 
11. Flight 11: August 6, 2015 
 
Table 33. Configuration 2, flight 11 data. 
  
 
 
Notes: Encounters were cancelled due to weather. All aircraft flew to altitude, but could not establish VMC. At 
end of flight, the NASA 608 aircraft flew on its own to troubleshoot a magnetic course problem. 
Encounters: None. 
Airspace: No data. 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.95 in/Hg, virga/rain, clouds at FL145 
Wind: No data. 
Bottom Line: The weather was too poor to perform encounters this day. The event was unfortunate since it seemed 
that this day would be the first day where all systems were functional. 
12. Flight 12: August 7, 2015 
 
Table 34. Configuration 2, flight 12 data. 
  
 
 
Notes: This flight began as a rehearsal flight, but turned into a CST. ARC was showing traffic somewhere close 
to the North Pole.  
Encounters: The N3GC return to base (RTB) 1641 local time; only flew a partial encounter due to problems with 
scripts. COMEX was set to 1731 local time and a 500 fpm descent (FL140 to 136) by the NASA 865 aircraft at ENC 2 
was performed; TA received. 
Airspace: F-35 NOTAM, but cancelled (did not affect runs). Affected takeoff time: 1530 as opposed to 1430. 
Barometer/Visibility: 29.84 in/Hg 
Wind: 265/37 
Bottom Line: Continuing troubleshooting the entire system since software changes were made on the NASA 608 
computer without informing other team members. During the encounter, TC/TD were uncertain if visual had been 
picked up since a “negative visual” was called. A visual was picked up after the encounter by the pilots, but there was 
still uncertainty on the ground. Thus it was communicated to only call positive visuals during flights. 
  
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
Rehearsal 2
CNPC
1.1 hours
NASA865, N3GC
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
Rehearsal 3
CNPC
2.8 hours
NASA865, N3GC
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13. Flight 13: August 10, 2015 
 
Table 35. Configuration 2, flight 13 data. 
  
 
 
Notes: The NASA 865 aircraft was seeing the NASA 608 aircraft 200 ft above.  
Encounters:  
1) Fireline 1  
 1 – good  
 2 – course correction, bad 
 3 – good 
 4 – good 
 5 – good 
 6 – good 
 7 – good 
 8 – good 
 9 – good 
 10 – some stale data on RGCS, INT2 RA climb 100 ft, good 
2) Fireline 2  
 1 – good 
 2 – good 
 3 – good 
 4 – good 
 5 – good  
 6 – good 
 7 – good 
 8 – good 
 9 – good  
Airspace: F-16 aircraft south of highway 58, could not use WP 5 for a short time (did not affect runs). 
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type Push O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA
1 VE1 Virtual 140 (145) N/A N/A
2 ENC1 Live 15:45:15 141 136 TA N/A N/A
3 ENC2 Live 15:17:15 141 N/A N/A 145 TA
4 VE2 Virutal 141 - N/A N/A
5 VE3 Virtual 141 (145) N/A N/A
6 VE3.5 Virtual 141 - N/A N/A
7 VE4 Virtual 141 (143) N/A N/A
8 VE5 Virtual 141 (135) N/A N/A
9 ENC3 Live 15:41:37 141 137 TA N/A N/A
10 ENC4 Live 15:42:39 141 N/A N/A 145 TA/RA
1 VE1 Virtual 141 (145) N/A N/A
2 ENC1 Live 16:12:48 141 TA 137 TA N/A N/A
3 ENC2 Live 16:17:12 141 TA N/A N/A 144 TA
4 VE2 Virtual 141 (145) N/A N/A
5 VE3 Virtual 141 (144) N/A N/A
6 VE4 Virtual 141 (145) N/A N/A
7 VE5 Virtual 141 (135) N/A N/A
8 ENC3 Live 16:38:14 141 (137) TA N/A N/A
9 ENC4 Live 16:40:49 141 N/A N/A 145 TA
Data
Data Collect 1
HSI
2.8 hours
NASA865, N3GC
Fireline 1 - COMEX 1510
Result
Clear of conflict 15:12:56
15:16:03 O/S turned right
15:19:39 turning left
Left turn
-
Fly-through
15:36:07 L273
Fly-through
17:04:01 RT
15:50:42 L248, int2 O/S RA climb 100ft
Fly-through
16:15:06 R168
16:21:43 R129
Fireline 2 - COMEX 1610
16:47:13 R344
16:29:32 L107
16:34:33 L263
Fly-through
Fly-through
16:41:46 R326, South 319
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Barometer/Visibility: 29.86 in/Hg, clear at FL140, haze at FL120 and below 
Wind: INT2 152/19, Fireline 2 INT2 ENC 2 201/28 
Bottom Line: Overall, it was a good flight day. A few problems were discovered, like turning prior to a WP 5 
versus of flying into it; what the researchers expected and what was done did not coincide. Additionally, ENC 4 was 
expected to be a “beak-to-beak” encounter. A correction was made to the flight cards for a different intruder heading 
to create this geometry. 
14. Flight 14: August 11, 2015 
 
Table 36. Configuration 2, flight 14 data. 
  
 
 
Notes: The N3GC aircraft was showing 100 ft high on Zeus temporarily.  
Encounters:  
1) Fireline 1 
 1 – good  
 2 – good  
 3 – bad  
 4 – good  
 5 – good  
 6 – good  
 7 – O/S seemed to head too much south, INT1 RA descend 100 ft, good  
 8 – good  
2) Fireline 2 
 1 – good  
 2 – good  
 3 – good  
 4 – good  
 5 – good  
 6 – good  
 7 – good  
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type Push O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA
1 VE1 Virtual 141 (145) N/A N/A
2 ENC1 Live 15:12:47 141 136 N/A N/A
3 ENC2 Live 15:18:55 141 N/A N/A 144 TA
4 VE2 Virutal 141 (139) N/A N/A
5 VE3 Virtual 141 (145) N/A N/A
6 VE4 Virtual 141 (135) N/A N/A
7 ENC3 Live 15:38:34 141 136 TA N/A N/A
8 ENC4 Live 15:43:00 141 TA N/A N/A 145 TA/RA
1 VE1 Virtual 141 (145) N/A N/A
2 ENC1 Live 16:08:48 141 TA 136 TA N/A N/A
3 ENC2 Live 16:14:34 141 TA N/A N/A 145 TA
4 VE2 Virtual 141 (140) N/A N/A
5 VE3 Virtual 141 (145) N/A N/A
6 VE4 Virtual 141 - N/A N/A
7 VE5 Virtual 141 (135) N/A N/A
8 ENC3 Live 16:34:50 141 136 TA N/A N/A
9 ENC4 Live 16:37:47 141 TA N/A N/A 145 TA/RA 16:42:27 L262
Left
16:25:10 L076
Fly-through
16:33:29 R334
No maneuver
15:47:39 L272
Fireline 2 - COMEX 1606
16:08:28 L111
16:11:06 L115
16:17:56 R113, R133
Data Collect 2
HSI
2.7 hours
NASA865, N3GC
Data
Result
Fireline 1 - COMEX 1510
Fly-through
15:14:59 L111
No maneuver
15:25:38 R148
Fly-through
Fly-through
15:41:39 R301
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 8 – INT1 not enough run-in, bad  
 9 – INT2 RA climb 
Airspace: Temporarily restricted from using WP 5 (did not affect runs). 
Barometer/Visibility: Fireline 1: 29.87 in/Hg, Fireline 2: 29.86 in/Hg, clear 
Wind: INT1 190/25, INT2 182/36, Fireline 2: ENC1 INT1 158/25, ENC2 INT2 189/29 
Bottom Line: Another seemingly good flight day. Although the researchers mentioned that only 6 of the 8 
encounters were usable, real flight data was gathered and considered beneficial. The heading changed employed a day 
prior for one of the encounters was also more successful. 
15. Flight 15: August 12, 2015 
 
Table 37. Configuration 2, flight 15 data. 
  
 
 
Notes: There was a problem observed with RGCS only sending a WP command once when off autopilot. This day 
marked the highest barometric pressure seen during Flight Test Series 3, topping out at 30.02 inHg. The barometric 
pressure was showing the NASA 608 aircraft 100 ft low on Zeus. During the phase of no alerting during Fireline 1, 
ADS-B targets were showing frozen for the ghost controller. 
Encounters:  
1) Fireline 1 
 1 – good  
 2 – good  
 3 - INT2 RA climb, good  
 4 – good  
 5 – good  
 6 – good  
 7 – good  
 8 – no alerting, bad  
 9 – no alerting, bad 
2) Fireline 2  
 1 – good  
Flight
SUT
Duration
Intruder(s)
# Scenario Type Push O/S Alt. TA/RA Int1 Alt. TA/RA Int2 Alt. TA/RA
1 VE1 Virtual 139 (145) N/A N/A
2 ENC1 Live 14:58:18 139 136 N/A N/A
3 ENC2 Live 15:03:02 139 TA N/A N/A 143 TA/RA
4 VE2 Virutal 139 (147) N/A N/A
5 VE3 Virtual 139 (132) N/A N/A
6 VE4 Virtual 139 (142) N/A N/A
7 VE5 Virtual 139 (135) N/A N/A
8 ENC3 Live 15:24:11 139 TA 134 TA N/A N/A
9 ENC4 Live 15:26:05 139 TA N/A N/A 143 TA
1 VE1 Virtual 139 (145) N/A N/A
2 ENC1 Live 15:58:12 139 TA 136 TA N/A N/A
3 ENC2 Live 16:01:40 139 N/A N/A 144 TA
4 VE2 Virtual 139 (143) N/A N/A
5 VE3 Virtual 139 (145) N/A N/A
6 VE4 Virtual 139 (147) N/A N/A
7 VE5 Virtual 139 (135) N/A N/A
8 ENC3 Live 16:22:54 139 136 N/A N/A
9 ENC4 Live 16:25:01 139 TA N/A N/A 143 TA
-
Fly-through
16:18:20 L289
16:22:27 R308
16:26:21 L243
16:31:18 L300
Data
Result
Fireline 1 - COMEX 1455
-
14:59:57 R179
15:07:07 R124
Right
15:12:18 L078
15:21:23 L322
No alert on VSCS
No alert on VSCS
Fireline 2 - COMEX 1555
Fly-through
16:00:50 L173
16:06:14 R124
Fly-through
Data Collect 3
HSI
2.5 hours
NASA865, N3GC
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 2 – target freeze on the NASA 608 aircraft, INT1 RA descend 100 ft, bad 
 3 – good  
 4 – good  
 5 – good  
 6 – good  
 7 – good  
 8 – good  
 9 – altitude seemed incorrect, bad 
Airspace: No data. 
Barometer/Visibility: Fireline 1: 30.02 in/Hg; Fireline 2: 30.00 in/Hg, clear, but slight haze 
Wind: INT1 185/20, INT2 185/20, Fireline 2: INT1 180/28, INT2 227/22 
Bottom Line: This day did not seem as successful as others, due to only achieving 5 of the 8 planned live intruder 
points. Problems with the RGCS/VSCS and also the barometric pressure affected system performance. Flight 15 was 
also the final flight day before additional Configuration 2 flights were cancelled. The researchers recognized that they 
were not getting the type of data and alerting they required, and also, the system was not acting the way it was thought 
to (VSCS, et cetera). The decision was made to end the test and gather lessons learned to make improvements to the 
fireline and further flight testing of the full mission. 
VI. Operational Observations and Lessons Learned 
The many months of planning and coordination were a key factor in the success of the Flight Test Series 3 
Configuration 1. Although successful, lessons learned can be drawn and built into future similar flight testing, 
especially concerning events that lead to Configuration 2. The following are some of the lessons learned from Flight 
Test Series 3. 
A. Configuration 1 and Configuration 2 Flight Tests are Distinct and Separate 
The two flight-test configurations were considered as a single test event. A limited amount of time was available 
between the two configurations to complete all necessary planning, integrating, and approval briefings. The following 
highlights the distinctions between the two configurations. 
The workload was significantly different. Configuration 1 flights were workload intensive. As many as 30 
encounters were planned during a flight and each encounter was allotted only 10 minutes to complete, including setup. 
Aircrew needed to navigate to new coordinates, understand the upcoming encounter geometry, and setup to make the 
IP within 5 to 10 seconds of the start of the exercise. Each encounter was distinct and required the aforementioned 
steps to be re-executed each time. Additionally, up to 3 early morning flights were performed per week, adding to 
crew rest and fatigue considerations. 
Configuration 2 flights were significantly less intensive for the airborne participants. The majority of the test 
decisions were made by the RGCS, a ground based resource. The airborne participants simply ensured the aircraft was 
on the planned parameters while the ground element directed the ownship maneuvers. Furthermore, from one run to 
the next the encounters did not change. Each intruder executed the same two encounters while the ownship expected 
the same four encounters changed only by the response of the ground element and basic environmental factors such 
as winds aloft. Configuration 2 flights were afternoon flights, and flow daily. 
That being said, the ownship maneuvers were less predictable in this configuration. The pilot in the RGCS changed 
from one flight to the next which resulted in a variation of responses to the presented encounters. On one occasion a 
pilot skipped an encounter altogether having requested and been granted approval by the virtual ATC controller. 
A key factor to the success of both configurations during flight was the support provided from the SAF team 
members and especially the TC. In terms of mission success, the TC was responsible for observing the timing of each 
encounter, reporting and taking winds aloft into consideration, and noting the overall development of each live 
encounter. The TC/TD tremendously reduced the aircrew workload and put the burden of success tasks to the SAF 
test team. 
Recommendation: Decrease the number of flights per week for early morning sorties (or increase the duration of 
each sortie). Reduce the planned number of test encounters per sortie in order to provide more time to execute each 
run. Increase the number of test sorties in order to complete the desired test points. Allocate more time between 
configurations. The additional time will help ensure success criteria is clearly understood. Clearly communicate the 
differences between the two configurations more as test phases than simply configurations.  
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B. Configuration 2 Flights were Cancelled after 3 of 10 Data Collection Flights and Configuration 1b was Not 
Attempted 
On August 12, 2015, the Configuration 2 flight test was terminated with only 3 of 10 data collection flights 
completed. Although 15 flights in total had been completed, 12 of them were system check and troubleshooting events. 
Additional details on the effectiveness and suitability of the Configuration 2 system are subject to ongoing analysis 
and not available at the time of drafting this paper. ARC-HSI determined that the flight-test data would not adequately 
suit their objectives and recommended termination of the remaining flights. To mitigate, ensuring adequate 
development time prior to FT4 or subsequent flight tests is paramount. The addition of system check periods with a 
long enough time to allow system enhancements, changes, or fixes, should be mandatory. 
Additionally, the aircraft planned for the Configuration 1b high-speed ownship test event, the GRC S-3B, was not 
able to meet the development time constraints and was not in the desired flight-test configuration for FT3. Similar to 
the case of Configuration 2, additional time is required for development and system checks. Unlike Configuration 2, 
the decision to forgo Configuration 1b was not as critical, since the researchers felt the data acquired with the low-
speed ownship, Ikhana, was adequate for this phase of the flight test. 
C. Multiple Operating/Staging Locations Decreased Efficiency in Test Execution 
Operating from KEDW, KVNY, KPMD, and KBFL was a challenge to ensure efficient test execution. On multiple 
occasions, supporting aircraft were held at their staging locations for ATC clearances. Additionally, the offsite aircraft 
needed a higher bingo fuel in order to return to their staging location. During Configuration 1 events, one or possibly 
two more encounters per flight could have been completed if all aircraft were in the same location.  
During Configuration 2 flights the remote staging location of the NASA 608 aircraft was planned to add the ability 
for a 3rd fireline run; however, the T-34 was too fuel limited and could not attempt a 3rd run regardless of staging 
location, and therefore negated the primary benefit of being located off site. Furthermore, the amount of 
troubleshooting conducted with the NASA 608 aircraft, LVC, and RGCS would have benefitted significantly from 
being in the same location.  
Recommendation: Base all aircraft together at AFRC for FT4 and subsequent flight-test events. 
D. Low Priority within R-2515 Resulted in Missed Flight-Test Opportunities 
Both test configurations were impacted by low prioritization. Configuration 2 operations were more significantly 
impacted since the routes of flight for both ownship and intruder aircraft utilized more of the airspace than 
Configuration 1 required and were therefore more in conflict with other airspace users. Additionally, Configuration 2 
flights started at 1500 local time which was an impacted time of day (although this operation time was chosen at the 
recommendation of USAF airspace management personnel).  
Configuration 1 operations within the Mercury Spin and Four Corners work areas were more contained within 
known UAS working areas and were therefore less impacted by other users. However, on some occasions the FT3 
participating aircraft were restricted to certain altitude blocks or lateral bounds which decreased the amount of 
encounters completed while the team waited for the traffic to clear. Configuration 1 flights started at 0600 local time 
and, in general, operations occurring between 0600 to 0800 local time tend to experience little to no conflicts with 
other traffic. 
Recommendation: For complex routing like the Configuration 2 route, it would increase the mission success rate 
if the route of flight remains clear of R-2515. Additionally, planning for early morning operations (from 0600 to 
0800 local time) will likely increase the success rate for executing and completing the test as planned.  
E. An Intruder was within 1 nmi and Less Than 500-ft Vertical Separation without Being Visual on Ikhana 
Background data: During Flight 5 of Configuration 1, while conducting a challenging multi intruder sequential 
TCAS encounter, the first intruder did not acquire a visual acquisition (or callout) of Ikhana and reported the miss 
after the encounter had been completed. Further, personnel within the SAF did not recognize the missed call or query 
the intruder aircrew to call out the visual. The flight was completed without further incident. The missed visual violated 
the FT3-9 mission rule.  
Analysis: After post-flight discussion it was determined that hazy conditions, test point complexity, and an inside 
cockpit focus were significant contributors to the mission rule violation. It was also determined that preplanned routing 
which maintained a 0.5 nmi lateral and 300-ft vertical separation was able to maintain an adequate level of safety, 
although should not be relied upon as a the sole mitigation.  
Mission relation: Should any manned aircraft fail to acquire visual during FT4 or subsequent tests, the consequence 
may lead to a closer than planned encounter (either laterally or vertically) and may increase the chances of a midair 
collision.  
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Recommendation/conclusion: The test team developed CRM procedures to help aircrew determine when the visual 
boundary, 1 nmi, was approaching: 
 The new procedures became a mandatory briefing item. 
 The TC was responsible for notifying all participants that the next encounter would require a visual. 
 The TC would provide range calls over the radio. 
 At approximately 1.5 nmi separation a “Check Visual” call was made giving the aircrew ~5 seconds to 
acquire a visual or abort the encounter.  
No further violations occurred after Flight 5 and these additional procedures should be carried forward into future 
flight-test events. 
F. Configuration 1b was Not Attempted 
Background data/analysis: The aircraft planned for this test event, the GRC S-3B, was not able to meet the 
development time constraints and was not in the desired flight-test configuration for FT3. 
Recommendation/conclusion: The other research teams felt that the data acquired with the Ikhana ownship were 
adequate and the Configuration 1 objectives were met. 
G. Planning for Nominal and Off Nominal Conditions was Not Clear or Distinct Enough 
Some discussion in brief and debrief was spent on the differences between lost-link altitude and deconfliction 
altitude during the briefing and debrief. The discussion resulted in some confusion on which altitude the aircraft should 
fly after the encounter. The following are the expectations and recommendations from the operations group. 
Deconfliction altitude:  This altitude is the planned altitude listed on the card that all aircraft should be at after 
completing the encounter and with TC coordination. Deconfliction altitude is a nominal condition.  
Lost-link altitude: This altitude is the altitude Ikhana will be at in a contingency event where the aircraft loses link. 
It is designed to keep the aircraft predictable for the other intruder aircraft for a short period of time prior to Ikhana 
proceeding to lost-link holding points. The lost link altitude is an off nominal condition, and the altitude does not need 
to mirror that of nominal conditions. 
H. Haze, Clouds, and Wind Aloft Affecting Encounters 
Environmental factors impacted FT3 in the following ways: 
Haze due to smoke from southern California wildfires reduced the visibility at the aircraft operating altitude 
enough that it was a contributing factor to the mission rule violation. It is of note that later in the flight visibility at 
higher altitudes was significantly better.  
Clouds, broken layers, caused the cancellation of one Configuration 2 mission rehearsal flight. No other flights 
were significantly impacted.  
Winds aloft were sometimes greater than 30 kn. Station keeping was affected for Configuration 1 flights and made 
arriving at the IP on time challenging. For Configuration 2 flights, the intercept was significantly impacted by high 
winds and in some cases caused missed encounters.  
Recommendation:  It is important for aircrew to assess the environmental conditions and make recommendations 
to the TC. Should a haze or cloud layer decrease the visuals, the TC needs to be informed and all participants can 
make accurate assessments and decisions. In most cases a shift in test altitude would mitigate the haze layer problem. 
A mitigation for high winds aloft is to develop a tool for the TC/TD to determine push times that account for winds 
aloft. 
I. Understanding Success Criteria and Training Operators was Critical to Mission Success 
Over the course of FT3, the test team seemed to struggle to understand what the exact success criteria was for each 
SUT. Since there were multiple SUTs, the success criteria was not the same from one to another, and this situation 
was not always clear to the team. For Configuration 1 the following were SUT: JADEM, Stratway+, radar, TCAS, 
and CPDS. Each system utilized a different display. Training was conducted by each SUT researcher, and with the 
researcher present during their respective flights, mission success was maximized. It is noteworthy to point out that 
the training conducted by the CPDS researcher was the most effective and required the least amount of intervention 
during the flight itself. In the other system cases, the researcher had to provide instruction in real time to ensure correct 
data were being generated.  
Recommendation: In order to emulate the desired training, the operations team will provide a template for future 
test events that identifies what training is required, a format for presenting the material, and a schedule of when it will 
be accomplished. Additionally, a clear understanding of what the researcher expects out of the SUT will be explained 
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to the test team. An example of why proper training is required is in one case during FT3, a system was de-energized 
by the test team when the researcher, in fact, wanted to deselect a component of the system. 
J. Separate Truth Source for Positional Data from Each Aircraft Were Not Available for Post Flight Analysis 
Post-flight analysis of TSPI information was not a requirement for FT3. However, for higher fidelity evaluation 
of the radar, TCAS, and CPDS, a TSPI truth source such as Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) would 
have been beneficial. Additionally, the time and geolocation sync from one data source to another was not easily and 
clearly determined resulting in significant post processing to sync all data sources.  
Recommendation: A truth data source should be considered standard equipment for any flight-test operation. 
Incorporate DGPS or suitable TSPI data source on each intruder and ownship aircraft. Ensure all data being collected 
are time synced. 
VII. Researcher Observations and Lessons Learned 
Discussion with researchers post flight test summarized the success of FT3 and outlined findings that will be 
beneficial to future test activities such as FT4.  
A. FT3 Configuration 1 Successfully Completed the Major Objectives for all SUT 
All stakeholders considered this phase a success and in many cases a first for their SUT.  
ARC team members collected good data that will be used to update their simulation model and support future test 
efforts including Part Task 6 (PT6) and verification and validation (V&V) of MOPS, and FT4. The data supports 
operational concept developments for aircraft in the cruise phase of flight.  
LaRC team members collected more data in one flight-test event than had been collected in past simulated events. 
The data will be used to update their simulation model and help develop Phase I MOPS for SC-228 and eventually 
the Federal Aviation Administration. Additionally, FT3 was the first time a multi intruder encounter was conducted 
for these purposes. For LaRC, many successful scenarios were completed and all objectives were met, and they will 
continue to find areas for improvement. 
CPDS teams consider FT3 a success at collecting several corner case scenarios that challenge both the algorithm 
and aircrew judgment and decision making based off the CPDS displays. All data analyzed to date appear to correlate 
with simulation.  
The TCAS and radar stakeholders from GA-ASI both report good data collected for their systems and intend to 
implement enhancements based off the data collected. The TCAS alerts presented to the crews were within TCAS 
specifications, but crews recommended some user interface changes that better help them get instant SA once a TCAS 
message is displayed.  
The HSI teams were not able to use the data from Configuration 2 flights for technical reasons, still being analyzed. 
B. ARC and LaRC Requested all Test Aircraft Keep Heading and Airspeed More Stable in Future Test Events 
Both teams noted in preliminary data analysis that in some cases the aircraft would change airspeed or heading in 
order to arrive at CPA at the planned time. Although this correction was intended and permitted, up to 90 seconds 
from CPA the changes in aircraft state perturbed the researchers’ desired data to a minimal extent. In follow on test 
events, the research teams request aircrew accept the aircraft conditions at the IP as long as they are within timing 
tolerances. One way to mitigate errors is to add real-time monitoring of the ownship and intruder speeds, heading, 
altitude, predicted CPA, et cetera. Further planning is required for FT4 to ensure accurate understanding of the success 
criteria, and on condition parameters will be constrained to help mitigate perturbations. 
C. VSCS Displays Did not Function for ARC and LaRC 
For both teams, the planned SUT display did not function correctly. The LaRC team determined that there was not 
enough granularity in the display for crews to make accurate heading change decisions. They reverted to the Stratway+ 
native displays on subsequent flight days.  
The ARC team used VSCS for all of their planned encounters, but for the encounters that provided directive 
guidance, the display did not function correctly. Integration issues between AutoResolver and the VSCS display gave 
inaccurate headings and turn directions to the crews, which resulted in skewed data for those runs that required the 
aircrew to maneuver per the guidance. The ARC team did not have an alternative display available. For FT4, resources 
should be assigned to ensure proper integration between AutoResolver and VSCS. 
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D. Radar Vertical Speed Indications were Not Filtered 
The SUT stakeholders that used the radar as a contributing sensor were expecting filtered radar data. Their 
algorithms noted significant shifts in vertical speed that would have been dampened out if filtered. However, the GA-
ASI radar team understood that filtering to be inherent to the system that used the data, as opposed to imbedded with 
the radar itself. Since there are no clear requirements for what a certified radar system should do, GA-ASI intends to 
implement a filtered data stream for FT4.  
E. An FT4 Data Collection Plan is Desired 
SC-228 representatives as well as the FT3 research teams noted that the data collection plan and implementation 
for FT3 resulted in some inconsistencies that may be reduced with a more detailed collection effort. As noted, multiple 
data sources with different time syncs needed to be post processed. Specifically, the data from the N3GC aircraft was 
a relative time sync as opposed to a GPS time. Planning for a common time sync and installation of a truth source data 
system for test aircraft should help mitigate this issue. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Flight Test 3 gathered excellent data for each system under test. This successful outcome is largely attributed to 
the experience that was acquired from the Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xu self-separation initial flight test 
flown in December 2014. Configuration 1 was a tremendous success thanks to the training, member participation, 
integration/testing, and in-depth analysis of the flight points. Although Configuration 2 flights were cancelled after 3 
data collection flights due to various problems, the lessons learned will help the Unmanned Aircraft System integration 
in the National Airspace System (UAS-NAS) project move forward successfully in future flight phases. 
The hope is for other projects conducting flight tests to take the methods and lessons learned in this flight activity 
and apply them to their own activities for executing a successful mission. 
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Figure 1. Flight-test area for Configuration 1 (highlighted) was in R-2515 at EAFB and also included the 
Buckhorn MOA. 
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Figure 2. Configuration 2 flight-test area traversed both R-2515 and R-2508, which includes the Isabella MOA. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Aircraft staging areas. 
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Figure 4. SAF control room displays. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Configuration 1 timeline. 
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Figure 6. Configuration 2 timeline. 
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Figure 7. Altimeter calibration flight card. 
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Figure 8. Configuration 1 pairwise encounters nomenclature. 
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Figure 9. ARC pairwise encounter angles 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. ARC pairwise encounter angles 2. 
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Figure 11. ARC pairwise encounter vertical profiles. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. ARC high-speed intruder pairwise encounter angles. 
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Figure 13. LaRC pairwise encounter angles. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. LaRC pairwise encounter vertical profiles 1. 
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Figure 15. LaRC pairwise encounter vertical profiles 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. LaRC pairwise multiship encounters 1. 
 
81 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
 
Figure 17. LaRC pairwise multiship encounters 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. LaRC pairwise multiship encounters 3. 
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Figure 19. LaRC high-speed intruder pairwise encounter angles. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. LaRC high-speed pairwise multiship encounters 1. 
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Figure 21. LaRC high-speed pairwise multiship encounters 2. 
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Figure 22. GA-ASI CPDS pairwise encounters. 
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Figure 23. GA-ASI CPDS multiship pairwise encounters. 
 
 
 
Figure 24. GA-ASI low altitude pairwise radar encounters. 
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Figure 25. GA-ASI radar CBDR pairwise encounters (110°). 
 
87 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
 
Figure 26. GA-ASI radar CBDR pairwise encounters (90°). 
 
 
 
Figure 27. GA-ASI radar zig-zag pairwise encounter. 
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Figure 28. GA-ASI TCAS mitigated pairwise encounters 1. 
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Figure 29. GA-ASI TCAS mitigated pairwise encounters 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 30. GA-ASI TCAS sequential pairwise encounters. 
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Figure 31. GA-ASI TCAS sequential pairwise encounters vertical profile 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 32. GA-ASI TCAS sequential pairwise encounters vertical profile 2. 
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Figure 33. ARC high-speed ownship pairwise encounter angles. 
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Figure 34. Pairwise encounters ownship example test card. 
 
93 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
 
Figure 35. Pairwise encounters intruder example test card. 
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Figure 36. Fireline ownship route with live intruder intercepts. 
 
 
 
Figure 37. Fireline routing, ownship, and live/virtual intruders. 
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Figure 38. Full Mission fireline route and encounters. 
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Figure 39. Full Mission ownship test card. 
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Figure 40. Full Mission intruder 1 test card. 
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Figure 41. Full Mission intruder 2 test card. 
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Figure 42. List of planned and flown encounters for each day of flight. The names of the scenarios are based 
off nomenclature crafted specifically for FT3. 
 
